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Abstract
When it comes to monetary and, especially, fiscal policy, standard focus relates
to topics such as changes in policy regimes, general tax levels, fiscal expenditures,
and uncertainties therein. These are broad abstractions from reality, which more
often deals with policies that are more subtle than these. These seemingly small
policy changes possess the potential to have dramatic and lasting impacts on
the economy. My dissertation considers some of these smaller policies, their co-
ordination with monetary policy, and their potential impact on the economy in
general. Included in these policies are the removal of small currency denomina-
tions from circulation, the indexation of the federal income tax code, and the use
of differing measures of inflation in policy considerations. My findings suggest
that some policies considered to be important may not be, while other policies
deemed insignificant can have dramatic consequences.
For example, policy makers have been increasingly concerned with the future
of the monetary system’s foundation: currency. While some have focused on
larger denominations, for decades a debate has focused on the effects of price-
rounding if the smallest denominations are eliminated. In my first chapter, I
deviate from the bulk of the literature, which typically considers case-studies with
empirical simulations and data manipulation, and evaluate a multiple household,
deterministic model with endogenous currency production. My findings suggest
that the elimination of the smallest unit of currency has a “nickel-and-dime” effect
on the economy, regardless of the rounding policy. This model is constructed and
calibrated to emulate a “worst-case scenario”, but it is also robust to the empirical
iii
results in the literature as well as the empirical results in this work.
In the second chapter, I consider a standard DSGE model with a labor income
tax code derived from household income levels, finding that subtle alterations in
this tax code can cause substantial changes in model dynamics. Specifically, I
find that indexing the federal income tax code for inflation in the 1980s had a
significant impact on the economy. My results are parallel to those of the recent
monetary/fiscal policy coordination literature without considering government
debt and to those of the Great Moderation literature without changing monetary
policy. This suggests that the reductions in volatility seen in the data were
not merely unilateral changes by monetary policy makers, but a combination of
single-handed movements on both sides. Thus, even if this combination of policy
changes was not sufficient to usher in the period of tranquility seen from the
late-1980s through the mid-2000s, this study suggests that they were necessary.
Finally, using a two-sector New Keynesian model with sector-specific levels of
price stickiness, I explore the impact of changing the monetary authority’s infla-
tion target from a narrow measure to a broad measure while fiscal policy continues
to index its tax codes and transfer payment systems to the narrow measure. I
find that a monetary policy adjustment like this can have a large impact on the
level and variation of real fiscal debt, but the magnitude and direction of the im-
pact is conditional on the coordinated stance of the policy makers. However, this
switch in regimes unconditionally causes most standard deviations to increase.
This matches the trends seen in latest time-varying parameter empirical mod-
els since 2000, when the Federal Reserve began using forecasts of the personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) chain-type price index instead of the consumer
price index (CPI).
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Chapter 1
Discontinuing Small Monetary
Denominations: Does it Really Matter?
1.1 Introduction
Using a multiple household, deterministic model, I find that the abandonment of small
units of currency will have a trivial effect on the economy. This model analyzes the direct,
indirect, distributional, and dynamic aspects of such a policy revision, finding that the
frivolous nature of these results spans all four dimensions. In the past, studies have been
conducted to investigate the overall effect of such an elimination, particularly direction and
magnitude of price rounding. Many of these investigations have used menu item simulations
with the most common of rounding policies, while others have applied these policies to actual
transaction data. The results of these studies have been controversial, citing net rounding-
up in some instances and net rounding-down in other instances. This paper diverges from
the simulation-based empirical methods and answers a rather simple question: how will the
overall economy react to this type of change in Treasury policy? I find that the direction
of price rounding does not matter, as even the most exaggerated magnitudes affect the
economy minimally. This model is robust to the estimates found in the literature, allowing
1
me to bridge the gap between their empirical work and this theoretical insight. All in all,
the worst-case scenario produces a cost of just over three dollars per person, per year in the
United States; with more realistic examples producing even less significant effects.
1.1.1 Background
The future of currency has been increasingly brought into the spotlight in the United States.
Some, such as Rogoff (2014), consider the usefulness of large currency denominations and
whether or not they are needed. On the other side of the spectrum, there has been growing
support in the United States for the elimination of the smallest denominations from the
coinage system. Many other countries have already passed policies of this nature, including
theUnited States, which eliminated the half-cent coin in 1857. This would be analogous to
eliminating the dime today, and yet I am unaware of any literature suggesting there were
serious consequences to this action. More recently, the Canadian government has moved to
phase out its one cent coin, citing increasing costs of production and marginal utilization of
the medium. Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have also transitioned
from their smallest denominated coins rather seamlessly, with New Zealand doing it twice
since 1990. Proponents of the move believe that the production cost of the penny is too high
for its lack of use, claiming that it costs taxpayers millions of dollars per year. Opponents
claim that the elimination of the penny, and the rounding policies that follow, will implicitly
establish a severe, regressive “rounding tax” that will drive up prices and cause overall welfare
to fall. President Barak Obama even addressed this issue in a Google+ Hangout interview
in February, 2013. When asked why the US Treasury has not discontinued the penny, he
responded simply by saying “[. . . ] I don’t know,” suggesting that an emotional attachment
to the penny has helped preserve it.
One of the most basic concepts of maintaining a stable, working fiat system is that the
value of the base materials on which currency is printed must be less than its face value (see
Cipolla, 1956; Smith and Sargent, 1997; Sargent and Velde, 1999). In 2012, the US Mint
2
Annual Report estimated that it cost roughly $0.016 on average for the raw materials to
produce a penny, and $0.02 overall. The same report also estimated that the US government
generated -$58 million in seigniorage from the penny in 2012 and has generated negative
seigniorage from the penny for the past seven years. While this paper focuses mostly on
the penny, the trend seen here is not exclusive to this coin. Nickels have the same problem,
requiring $0.0829 in raw materials and $0.1009 overall per coin. The fact that these coins
cost more to produce than their face value can have some bad consequences. By Gresham’s
law, and many of its derivatives, these coins are in danger of being exported or melted down
(see Rolnick and Weber, 1986). Figure 1.1 presents the futures prices for both copper and
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Figure 1.1: Price of Copper and Zinc Futures
Note: The data presented above are monthly and represented by the price on the first trading
day of each month. Copper is measured in US dollars per pound and is located on the left
axis, while Zinc is measured in US dollars per kilogram and is located on the right axis.
zinc, the raw materials needed to produce a penny. Both prices fell initially in the wake of
the financial crisis, but quickly rebounded. The increasing price of copper even prompted a
rash of theft across the nation as people tried to take advantage. Reports of stollen copper
piping from air conditioning units and construction sites skyrocketed. If the value of these
raw materials continued to rise, at what point would a black market emerge for melting the
coins down and selling them as their base materials? Of course, conducting such action is
illegal in accordance with United States Code, but that didn’t really stop individuals from
stealing the copper piping either.1
1See Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 17, Section 331 as well as United States Mint Press Release: December
14, 2006.
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On the other side of this “coin”, if the penny is eliminated, there will be a significant
disturbance in the economy from the ensuing rounding policies. Treasury policies in other
nations typically round purchases made with currency to the next-smallest denomination,
i.e. with transactions ending in $0.01, $0.02, $0.06, and $0.07 being rounded down and those
ending in $0.03, $0.04, $0.08, and $0.09 being rounded up in the United States. Much of
the controversy centers around the possibility that the price of the average transaction may
be rounded upwards, costing consumers millions of dollars every year. Other studies suggest
that, since the nickel’s face value is less than the value of its materials, eliminating the
penny would actually cost the government more since demand would shift from the penny
to the nickel, though these reports may be subject to bias (see Bosco and Davis, 2012).2
Also, since any rounding policy would only apply to cash transactions, the elimination of
the penny would be a regressive policy, hurting the poor more since they use cash and coin
as their primary medium of exchange.
The literature on this is topic is fairly thin, boiling down to two simple methods: a
simulation-based hypothetical approach, and an empirical-based, data-manipulation ap-
proach. The former is used by Lombra (2001, 2007) as well as Chande and Fisher (2003).
Lombra bases his simulations on the menu of a convenience store chain, estimating the cost
of transactions of three items or less. His results find that the prices of 60-93% of those
simulated purchases were rounded up, with 50-83% of them being paid for with cash. This
implies an annual cost to consumers of roughly $318-$818 million each year. Chande and
Fisher, on the other hand, conduct similar simulations and find that the distribution of the
hundredths place approaches uniformity as more items are purchased per transaction. This
implies that the rounding effect may be very small in a big picture sense, or even negative.
These results, and those of Lombra (2007) include the use of sales tax, whereas Lombra
(2001) does not. Distributionaly, Lombra estimates that around 9.5% of consumers in the
2This report was commissioned by Jarden Zinc Products, which claims to be “North America’s leading
plated coin blank producer." This report may be biased towards not eliminating the penny.
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United States do not have any kind of transactions account3, implying that this policy has
the potential to be extremely regressive. The lack of transaction accounts is important be-
cause only those purchases made with cash will be rounded, while those paid with other
types of money will not be. Thus, poorer households without these transactions accounts
will be subjected to this policy change more than richer households.
The second method, used by Whaples (2007), considers actual transactions data from a
convenience store chain, rounding those prices in accordance with the proposed policy. Upon
review of these estimates, he finds that the “rounding tax” is, on average, slightly negative,
finding only one State with a positive result. In all cases, whether positive or negative, these
results were not significantly different from zero. Thus, he finds that the net rounding effect
of such a policy will be effectively null.
One main cause of this small literature is that most of the nations that have undergone
this transition were emerging economies recovering from massive inflation, making the data
unreliable and the eliminated denominations nearly worthless. Those nations that consider
this policy without a hyperinflation episode are few, and their occurrences are few and far
between. For example, policy makers in Australia decided to phase out their one- and two-
cent coins in 1992. New Zealand implemented similar policy twice, doing away with their
one cent coin in 1990 and their five cent coin in 2006. Even though we have some examples of
this policy, in both scenarios global contagion caused increased volatility in both economies.4
Thus, there are many roadblocks to conducting reliable econometric tests. So, after a simple
empirical exercise, this paper takes a theoretical approach to see if, and to what degree,
the elimination of the penny will effect the economy. I propose a deterministic, structural
framework with two heterogeneous representative households, a producer, a banking sector,
and a government sector that uses taxes and worn out currency to produce new currency.
Using this simple model, I show the direct, indirect, distributional, and dynamic effects
3Credit cards, checking accounts, etc.
4“Black Monday" events sparked a US recession in the early 1990s and the global financial crisis beginning
in 2007 were felt by both nations either during or immediately after their transition periods.
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of eliminating small currency denominations and find that eliminating the penny will have
varying effects, but that these effects are too small to matter in the long run. Steady state
levels do adjust after the policy change, but the extent of this adjustment relative to the
magnitude of the policy change I propose is negligible at best. We examine the effects of a
policy change that essentially adds a half cent to the value of every dollar, which is orders
of magnitude larger than even the most extreme cases in the literature (see Whaples, 2007;
Lombra, 2001). Even with an extremely large change in policy, the effects are very small.
1.2 A Simple Empirical Test: Australia
While the data typically cannot be trusted due to exogenous events, I consider at least one
situation.5 Australia not only eliminated its one-cent coin in 1992, but also phased out its
two-cent coin simultaneously. So if there is to be a significant effect, we can expect to see
one here. Taking quarterly data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, I construct a
simple VAR model with a dummy variable. This dummy holds value zero when there is no
rounding policy, while holding a value of one starting in 1992:1. In this situation, I focus
on the coefficient values tied to the dummy. This will show whether there was a significant
structural change to the variables in the model or not. The variables included in this model
are seasonally adjusted GDP growth, a CPI-measured inflation rate, the log-difference of the
stock of currency, and the log-difference of general government final consumption expenditure
from 1970:1-2013:3. The AIC suggests a five-lag model, so I simply present the coefficients
on the dummy variable along with their 95% confidence intervals. The results are depicted
in Table (1.1).
As can be seen, while all coefficients are negative, none of them are significantly different
from zero, suggesting that there was no structural change in the Australian economy after the
implementation of the rounding policies. Some of the literature (specifically Lombra (2001,
5Australia was the only country which altered its monetary system far enough in the past and recorded
all the necessary data at a high enough frequency for a satisfactory test.
6
2007)) suggests that there could be significant upward pressure on inflation and government
spending while hurting the economy. These results suggest that, not only are the effects not
significant, but the estimates are in the opposite direction. The theoretical models presented
below yield very similar results.
1.3 The Mechanism at Work: A Two-Period Model
Before we can understand how the economy will react as a whole, we need to explore the
mechanism involved. Specifically, I am interested in how the households will react to the
change, abstracting towards simplifying assumptions such as constant government spending
and tax rates. I can then use these results to make inferences about the larger model. For
example, if the net effect of the policy change is that prices are rounded down, I find that
consumption levels rise and currency holdings fall. While government spending is constant
in this model, the increase in consumption and the decrease in the need for new currency
implies that there would be downward pressure on overall government expenditures if this
was not the case. Thus, the elimination of the penny is welfare-improving.
1.3.1 The Model
Here I present a two-agent, two-period endowment economy with currency production. The
first agent is a representative household which receives an endowment each period and has
the ability to invest and consume in the first period. In the second period, the household uses
all of the savings and investments, along with the second period endowment, to purchase
consumption goods. The second agent is the government, which takes in a sales tax from
the household and produces the currency used in transactions. After addressing the model,
I consider a change in the treasury’s policy that will effect the purchasing power of the
currency held by the household.
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The Household The household maximizes the discounted sum of its utility, where its
utility function for each period is given by
Ut = ln ct −
χct
µnt
for period t = {1, 2}, where c denotes real consumption, χ and µ are parameters representing
preferences and the Treasury policy, respectively, and n represents the stock of currency
holdings for the household given by the following law of motion
nt = n
p
t + (1− σ)nt−1.
To simplify the matter, I set n0 = 0, that is, it starts with zero currency holdings. The term
npt represents the newly printed currency in period t. The parameter σ represents the rate
at which currency wears out each period.6 The household receives an endowment of y1 in
the beginning of the first period and has the ability to consume and invest in government
bonds b. Combining these characteristics gives me the first-period budget constraint for the
household,
τc1 + b+ n
p
1 = y1,
where τ is the gross consumption tax rate levied on the household by the government. We
choose the sales tax over a lump sum tax for its distortionary and regressive properties.
Choosing this will ensure the maximum overall effects, if such effects exist, giving me the
extremes off which to base my analysis.
In the second period, the household once again receives an endowment y2 as well as
receiving the return on the bonds purchased in the first period and acquiring more currency
for purchases in the second period. Thus, the household’s budget constraint in the second
6For simplicity, I’ll refer to it as the depreciation rate of currency in the future, though this may be a
slight abuse of the language.
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period is as follows:
τc2 + n
p
2 = y2 + rb,
where r represents the gross interest rate on the government bonds.
The Government Here I consider a government which produces units of government
spending gt as well as currency for the economy npt . In order to finance these expenditures,
the government takes in the sales tax revenue from the household, collects the worn out
currency in the economy, and sells bonds. It costs the government ζ > 0 to produce each
unit of new currency. Thus, the government’s real budget constraints for each period are
g1 + ζn
p
1 = b+ (τ − 1)c1 + ∆n1 + σn0
and
g2 + rb+ ζn
p
2 = (τ − 1)c2 + ∆n2 + σn1,
where ∆nt represents the seignorage income from a change in the amount of currency in the
economy.
1.3.2 Comparative Statics: Treasury Policy Changes
Here, I analyze the effects of a change in the Treasury policy parameter µ. Notice that I
model this policy parameter so that, if prices are rounded down overall, the parameter will
increase, making currency more valuable. While this model is simple and only two periods,
the inclusion of currency into the model makes it too complex to solve by hand. Thus, I have
to calibrate the parameters and solve for the variables before acquiring numerical results for
the comparative statics problem.
Parameter Calibration This model contains six parameters which are calibrated to
match moments in the data or values commonly used in the literature. First, I normal-
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ize total output y to be unity. This is purely for simplification of the model. We then
calibrate the exogenous government spending g to be 0.20. This matches the mean quarterly
ratio of federal government current expenditures to nominal gross domestic product in the
United States between 1947:Q1 and 2013:Q1, which is 0.1971. We also calibrate the net in-
terest rate in the model r to be 1.04, which matches the average one-year Treasury constant
maturity rate between January 1987 and May 2013. We calibrate β, which is the personal
discount factor, to 0.995, which matches much of the literature cited in this paper. Our cur-
rency depreciation parameter σ is calibrated to 0.40 for two reasons. First, it’s large enough
to ensure that the government will have to produce new currency in the second period.
Second, one-dollar bills in the United States last an average of about 18 months, whereas
larger bills and coins last much longer. Since there are considerably more one-dollar bills in
circulation than any other paper denominations, this calibration seems to be a reasonable
estimate of the average depreciation of all paper currency. The calibration of the tax rate
τ is ten-percent. This sales tax rate is mostly ad hoc and larger than most state and local
rates, but since this is the only form of taxes in the model, letting this be a little larger than
the data suggests covers the fact that the overall amount of taxes paid is much larger than
that suggested by the model. The last two parameters χ and ζ are calibrated to ensure that
the levels of consumption in each period sum to approximately 0.65.7 The average quarterly
ratio of real personal consumption expenditure to real gross domestic product from 1947:Q1
to 2013:Q1 is 0.6547, meaning that a calibration of this type matches this moment in the
data. With this in mind, I calibrate the values to χ = 0.10 and ζ = 0.90.
Numerical Results for the Model Using the parameter values outlined above, I can
solve for the variables in the model. Using these values, along with the parameter values,
I can also numerically solve the comparative statics problem. Since the initial condition is
that the Treasury continues to produce the penny, I consider the changes to the variables
7Of course, the summation includes discounting the second period’s consumption by 1r , which is how the
total output for the two periods is summed.
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to a Treasury policy change when µ = 1, meaning that there is no rounding policy. Table
(1.2) presents these results. Notice that, as expected, consumption in both periods will move
proportionally with the Treasury policy parameter via an income effect. This means that, if
a policy change results in a net round-down situation (µ increases), then consumption will
rise in both periods. The effect on the second period’s currency holdings is inversely related
to the policy parameter, which in fairly intuitive since the value of currency increases when
prices are rounded down, allowing consumers to purchase more consumption goods with less
currency. The effect on the first period’s currency holdings is less certain. This value hovers
around zero, moving slightly one way or the other with adjustments to the tax policy or the
production cost of currency. This is also fairly intuitive since the consumer, in this model,
carries over the total currency holdings (net depreciation) to the second period.
1.4 Deterministic Model with Heterogeneous Households
While a two-period model does give us an idea of how the households will react to this
change (holding all else constant), the literature raises questions that require a slightly more
complex model, allowing for more endogenous adjustment. To address these questions, I
present a deterministic model of the economy with multiple, heterogeneous households and
a government sector that produces currency. One of the first questions deals with welfare
distribution, so I present one wealthy household and one poor household to the model. The
former is a typical Ricardian household that has access to the financial markets, allowing it
to consume and save in each period. The latter is a “rule-of-thumb” household as in Campbell
and Mankiw (1989). This household is also referred to as a “hand-to-mouth” household in
that it has no access to financial markets, meaning that all income is consumed immediately
(see Mankiw, 2000; Weber, 2000; Galí et al., 2007, for more examples).
We introduce a banking sector to the economy, which provides an inside money substitute
to the currency produced by the government. As in the previous model, the government takes
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in taxes through a sales tax and collects worn out currency to produce the new currency.
We also introduce a representative firm to analyze any labor-leisure tradeoffs. This firm uses
the labor provided by the households and the public goods produced by the government to
produce consumer goods.
1.4.1 The Heterogeneous Households
The Ricardian Household The population in this model is divided, consisting of (1−λ)
Ricardian households and λ “rule of thumb” households, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Following the
literature, I’ll denote the Ricardian, or optimizing, household with an “o”, such that a variable
x that belongs to this agent is referred to by xo. With a discount factor β, this household
maximizes an intertemporal problem with contemporaneous utility function
Uot = ln cot − ηhot −
1
χ
(
cotPt
M ot
)χ
, (1.1)
where cot , hot , Pt, andM ot denote real consumption expenditures, hours worked, the price level,
and the nominal monetary services aggregate, respectively. The monetary services aggregate
is a CES function that aggregates the purchasing abilities of outside money, denoted by
nominal currency holdings N ot , and inside money, denoted by nominal deposits Dt, in the
following manner
M ot =
[
ξ
1
θ (µN ot )
θ−1
θ + (1− ξ)
1
θD
θ−1
θ
t
] θ
θ−1
,
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the distribution parameter as described by Arrow et al. (1961), θ > 0
represents the elasticity of substitution between currency holdings and deposits in providing
monetary services, and µ represents a Treasury policy parameter that embodies the price
rounding effect on currency purchases (see Belongia and Ireland, 2012; Ireland, 2012, for
more uses of this functional form in this type of scenario.). Thus a net rounding down of
prices would be represented by an increase in µ. As a base for further analysis, the pre-
policy change value is set to µ = 1. The third part of expression (1.1) is a shopping time
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friction, which is a positive function of the consumption good and a negative function of the
purchasing medium. This expression is used frequently in the literature.
To encompass the ideas of a money multiplier and creation of inside money, I allow
the Ricardian household to save and borrow. In each period, it earns its wage income
Wth
o
t , receives its investment income via principle payments on government discount bonds
purchased last period Bt−1 and interest payments on deposits rdt−1Dt−1, and takes out loans
from the representative bank Lt. Here I consider Wt to be the nominal wage rate set by
the representative firm, and rdt to be the gross nominal interest rate on deposits set by the
representative bank. It then takes this income and uses it for consumption, investment in
new discount bonds, savings, repayment of debt from last period, and holdings of newly
printed currency N o,pt , where
N ot = N
o,p
t + (1− σ)N ot−1.
Currency depreciates at rate σ, which implies that the government needs to collect this
currency and replace it with new currency. Thus, the government needs to print currency
in order to keep up with both the change in the amount demanded as well as replace the
depreciated currency. With this in mind, the budget constraint of the Ricardian household
becomes
τtc
o
tPt +
Bt
rt
+Dt +N
o,p
t + r
l
t−1Lt−1 = Wth
o
t +Bt−1 + r
d
t−1Dt−1 + Lt,
where rlt is the gross interest rate on loans and τt is the gross sales tax rate.
The Hand-to-Mouth Household This household has no access to financial markets,
implying that it consumes all of its labor income in each period. Thus, it only has to
decide how many hours to work each period. As in the literature, I denote the rule-of-
thumb household’s variables with an “r” superscript. This household therefore maximizes its
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contemporaneous utility function each period, given by
U rt = ln crt − ηhrt −
1
χ
(
crtPt
M rt
)χ
,
where each of the variables are analogous to those of the Ricardian household. In this case,
however, the monetary services aggregate collapses to
M rt = ξ
1
θ−1µN rt
since this household cannot access financial markets for deposits. Since this household con-
sumes all its labor income, the budget constraint is simply
τtc
r
tPt = Wth
r
t (1.2)
and all labor income is converted to currency for consumption purposes, giving me µN rt =
Wth
r
t .8
1.4.2 The Representative Bank
The representative bank’s primary purpose is to provide a substitute for the Ricardian house-
hold’s medium of exchange. It’s secondary purpose is to facilitate multiple deposit creation
and the money multiplier that follows. Each period, the bank takes in new deposits and
payments on matured loans from last period. It also issues new loans, makes interest pay-
ments on last period’s deposits, and incurs a linear deposit creation cost xdDt, which causes
a wedge in the saving/borrowing process. Thus the profits Πbt for the representative bank
are given as
Πbt = Dt − Lt + rlt−1Lt−1 − rdt−1Dt−1 − xdDt.
8Combining this with equation (1.2) gives me an implicit Clower constraint, which seems to be redundant
considering I include the shopping time friction, but this allows me to ensure that the only decision this
household makes is one of labor hours.
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On top of this budget constraint, the bank is also subject to reserve requirements by the
monetary authority. In accordance with profit maximization, the bank wants to hold zero
excess reserves, holding only those that are required. Thus, I have the equilibrium condition
Lt = (1− ω)Dt for all t = 0, 1, . . . ; where ω ∈ [0, 1] represents the required reserves ratio.
1.4.3 The Representative Firm
The representative firm produces real output yt using the aggregate labor hours from the
households ht and the real public goods produced by the government gt.9 The firm pays
out a single wage rate Wt, so it does not care where the labor hours come from, maximizing
its profits Πft by choosing this aggregate, given by ht = (1 − λ)hot + λhrt . The production
function is constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas, such that yt = hαt g
1−α
t and α ∈ (0, 1).
The profit function of the representative firm is
Πft = Ptyt −Wtht.
1.4.4 The Government and Monetary Authority
The government in this model not only produces the public good Gt, but also prints new
currency Npt . To do so, the government must collect the sales tax from the households,
borrow from the households, and remove the depreciated currency from the economy. With
this in mind, the government’s budget constraint becomes
(τt − 1)ctPt +
Bt
rt
+ ∆Nt + σNt−1 = Gt +Bt + ζN
p
t ,
where ∆Nt represents the seignorage from the increase in the aggregate currency levels, ζ > 0
represents the cost of printing new currency, and ct represents real aggregate consumption.
Aggregate consumption and currency levels are given by ct = (1 − λ)cot + λcrt and Nt =
9Notice that lower case letters represent the real values of their corresponding upper-case variables.
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(1 − λ)N ot + λN rt , respectively. The tax policy used by the government follows the simple
rule
ln
(τt
τ
)
= φτ ln
(τt−1
τ
)
+ φy ln
(
yt
yt−1
)
,
where τ is the steady state level for the tax rate and φτ and φy are necessarily positive
parameters. The use of a cyclical tax rate ensures that the economy does not diverge in
one direction or another, while also being in line with a standard progressive tax code. The
autoregressive nature of this fiscal policy rule is considered due to the fact that tax policies
generally don’t change often or by very much at any particular time. The monetary authority
follows a Taylor (1993) type interest rate rule with smoothing
ln
(rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(rt−1
r
)
+ ρπ ln
(πt−1
π
)
,
where ρr and ρπ are positive parameters and r and π are steady state values for the bond
rate and the inflation rate, respectively.
1.5 Results
Here I present some of the findings in the model. We start with the calibration of the
parameter values, which are set using both the literature and historical data. We then
provide some graphical representations of the model dynamics after a foreseen, permanent
change to the Treasury policy parameter µ. We consider both rounding up and rounding
down scenarios, increasing the value of µ from unity to 1.005 and decreasing it to 0.995.
Specifically, I consider a situation where every dollar gains/loses a half cent in value. This
is much, much larger than any of the simulations in the literature suggest, but I consider
this larger value for expositional purposes.10 In addition, a larger value will show us what
10Lombra estimates that each transaction costs between five and six dollars. Following his method of
applying a one cent rounding tax to each transaction implies that Lombra’s analogous value would be
µL = 0.99828, or subtracting 0.182 cents from every dollar. Whaples estimates the per transaction benefit
to be about 0.025 cents, implying an average increase in value of 0.0045 cents per dollar, or µW = 1.0000455.
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happens to the economy if this change results in a massive, permanent shock to the economy.
One can think of this value as a best-case/worst-case scenario analysis.
1.5.1 Calibration
Whenever possible, I use quarterly data from 1987:1–2006:4 to encompass the beginning of
the Great Moderation up to just before the recent financial crisis. Some parameters are set
following past literature values. For example, I set χ = 5, ξ = 0.20, and θ = 0.50 following
Ireland (2012), which uses the same functional forms for the monetary services aggregate
and the shopping time friction. Considering Lombra (2001), who suggests that 9.5% of
households don’t have access to transaction accounts, I set λ = 0.095. Other variables are
set to fit simple intuition. For example, I calibrate η = 3 because the typical work day is eight
hours, or one third of the day. Setting η to this value gives me labor hours close to h = 1/3.
We also set α = 0.80, assuming that public goods produced by the government do not add
much to the production process, which leans heavily on labor hours. Another parameter
that can be set fairly easily is the steady state inflation rate. We set this to π = 1.005,
which implies an annual inflation rate of around two percent, the implied inflation target.
Considering general data trends found at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, I assume
that the typical unit of currency will wear out every five years or so, implying that σ = 0.05.
The same holds true for seigniorage data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserves
System, implying that ζ = 0.30, a value that ensures that producing currency yields positive
seigniorage in general.11
The rest of the parameters have been estimated using the data. We calibrate ω = 0.035 to
match the average ratio of the St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base less currency in circulation
and excess reserves to savings deposits at commercial banks. This is an estimate of the
average required reserves ratio during the period 1987:Q1–2006:Q4. For the same time
11This value for ζ is probably larger than it should be, but a larger value will again give me a worst-case-
scenario if it costs the government large amounts to produce the currency. We are also focusing more on the
effects of coin costs and not that of paper currency costs, which are dramatically larger, in a relative sense.
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period, I estimate the value of xd by considering a ratio of a deposit rate estimate to the
bank prime loan rate. The deposit rate estimate is the over-time average of the mean of the
6-month certificate of deposit secondary market rate and the rate on money market mutual
fund accounts. This gives me an arbitrary short-term interest rate that lies somewhere
between the highest and lowest available rates on differing types of interest bearing deposits.
Doing so implies that xd should be set to 0.01. The Ricardian household’s discount factor
β is set by considering the average effective federal funds rate over my calibrated value for
inflation. This gives me a value of β = 0.99. The parameter values in the fiscal policy rule are
set with a simple linear regression. Here I regress the values of the federal government current
tax receipts-to-personal consumption expenditures ratio against its owned lagged value and
the GDP growth rate. Doing so gives me parameter values φτ = 0.9009 and φy = 0.0074.
This implies that the tax rate does not react strongly to outside forces, which would coincide
with the idea that tax rates are mostly exogenous. The values for the monetary policy rule
were calibrated in the same fashion. Regressing the effective federal funds rate against its
own lag and a one-period lag of the inflation rate gives me parameter values of ρr = 0.96
and ρπ = 0.06.
1.5.2 Deterministic Shock Simulations
Since this paper considers fiscal policy, any policy change is announced in a particular period,
but there is a one year (four period) lag before the policy comes into effect. Figure (1.2)
shows the impulse responses for aggregate consumption, aggregate currency holdings, the
inflation rate, and government spending after a positive, permanent shock to the Treasury
policy parameter, i.e. prices are rounded down and µ increases to 1.005. Each of the panels
in the figure contains two vertical lines. These lines coincide with the announcement and
implementation of the policy change, respectively. We chose the aggregate values for each
because the individual household impulse response functions are nearly identical in shape,
so a broad, macroeconomic view represents a good statistic for these results.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses to a Permanent, Positive Treasury Policy Shock
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Policy Announcement As can be seen in the figure, the effects of this relatively large
shock are minor. Upon the announcement of the new policy, the households realize that
their steady state consumption levels will increase. Therefore, in an effort to smooth their
consumption, they deviate from their Euler equations and begin increasing consumption
immediately (panel 1). Due to the persistence in the tax level though, this transition is slow
and does not reach the new steady state level before implementation of the new policy. In
order to reach these higher levels of consumption, they need more currency and deposits,
as can be seen by the upwards drift in the second panel. This increase in consumption,
currency, and deposits puts upward pressure on inflation (panel 3), but is quickly corrected
by monetary policy. As for the government sector of the economy, the balanced budget
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assumption and the increased need for currency force the government to divert resources
from traditional spending to currency production. This is exacerbated by the fact that
output remains relatively unchanged, causing a crowding out effect that forces spending to
fall at a faster rate.
Policy Implementation Upon implementation of the new policy, the currency holdings
of the households become more valuable. This income effect causes consumption to spike
slightly and currency holdings to fall. This increase in consumption and the fall in seignorage
revenues cause government spending to fall temporarily at implementation. In a reversal of
the announcement period, the fall in currency holdings causes inflation to fall immediately,
but is corrected by monetary policy in the next period. The increase in the value of currency
also causes deposits to fall by a substitution effect. After the initial impact of implementation,
the households continue to transition to the new steady state level of consumption. This
increase causes an increased need for currency, which again combine to push government
spending down as in the announcement period.
If I reverse the net effect and follow the rounding direction estimated by Lombra (2001)
(µ = 0.995), I get nearly symmetric results, despite the inherent non-linearity of the model,
which coincides with his findings. In this scenario, welfare would fall, government spending
would increase, and there would be upward pressure on inflation. However, due to monetary
policy and an inflation target that is maintained, inflation is contained and the spike is even
neutralized, a situation not considered in the literature.
Overall, we can see in Table (1.4) that the long run effects of this permanent shock are
very small. This table shows the initial and resulting steady state values for the model, along
with the percentage change in each of them. We see that, for either a positive or negative
rounding result, most of the variables in the model will settle in close to their initial values.
The largest shift in any variable is in the currency holdings, but even this adjustment is
by less than a half of one percent in the aggregate. If we were to look at the data, this
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adjustment would imply that the currency component of M1 would increase or decrease by
around $3.6 million in the first quarter of 2013, or a little over a penny per person. Thus,
the long run effects of this policy, even after this large shock, would be insignificant. This
matches the empirical results from section 1.2, found in Table (1.1), suggesting that there
is virtually no change in GDP growth; while currency growth, inflation, and government
spending all fall by minute levels.
1.5.3 Welfare Analysis: Consumption Equivalent Variation
In this section, I conduct a welfare analysis using consumption equivalent variation (CEV).
In keeping with Lombra (2001), I consider the first five years after the policy announcement,
where the policy is announced at the beginning of the first year and implemented at the
beginning of the second year. To evaluate the CEV, I first consider the situation in which
the policy doesn’t change, i.e. the penny is not eliminated. We then consider the utility
function maximized by each household where policy does change. Adding my measure for
welfare gain or loss, I have the following utility functions,
max
20∑
t=0
βt
[
ln cit(1 + φ
i
w)− ηhit −
1
χ
(
cit
mit
)χ]
,
for i = {o, r}, where φow and φrw are the equivalent variation measurements for each of the
respective households.12 While the poor household is constrained to the point that it can
only make contemporaneous decisions, it discounts time in the same fashion as the rich
household. Considering the values depicted in Figure (1.2), and comparing these maximized
utility values with those considering only the initial steady state values, I find that, in the
case of a net-round down situation, both households are better off, though the poor household
is considerably more. The results are provided in Table (1.3). They show what percentage
of additional consumption is needed each quarter to make the household indifferent between
12Negative values for these measurements imply that the household is better off after the policy change,
whereas positive values indicate that the household is worse off.
21
Table 1.1: Dummy Variable Coefficients
Point Estimate Lower Conf. Bounda Upper Conf. Bounda
GDP Growth −0.00 −0.5571 0.5485
Inflation −0.22 −0.7818 0.3345
Currency Growth −0.14 −0.3551 0.0722
Gov. Spending Growth −0.11 −0.9240 0.6987
a A 95% confidence interval is considered here.
Table 1.2: Comparative Statics Results: µ
Variable Description Sign
c1 Period 1 Consumption +
c2 Period 2 Consumption +
n1 Period 1 Currency Holdings +/−
n2 Period 2 Currency Holdings −
Table 1.3: Welfare Analysis: Consumption Equivalent Variation
Measure Positive Shock Negative Shock Lombra (2001) Whaples (2007)
(µ = 1.005) (µ = 0.995) (µ = 0.99828) (µ = 1.0000455)
Rich CEV, φow -0.0441% 0.0444% 0.0152% -0.0004%
Poor CEV, φrw -0.7458% 0.7562% 0.2589% -0.0069%
Aggregate CEV, φaw -0.1108% 0.1120% 0.0384% -0.0010%
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the two situations. The last row of the table considers the aggregated CEV using the same
method as with the other terms in the model, φaw = (1− λ)φow + λφrw. Considering that the
rich household has access to financial markets, it is intuitive that its results are less volatile
than that of the poor household. Since the poor household is completely constrained and
cannot access financial markets, variations in the value of its currency holdings will cause
larger equivalency requirements. Thus, we see that the progressive/regressive nature of this
“rounding tax" depends on the direction of the rounding. If the net result is that we round
down, we find that the welfare gap closes slightly. If we round up, on the other had, then
the gap would widen.
Comparing to Past Results We can now take the values from Table (1.3) and see how
they compare to the results found in the literature, finding that my model is quite robust.
For example, Lombra (2001) claims that these changes will cost consumers no less than $1.5
billion over a five-year period. Using data on personal consumption expenditures (measured
in billions of chained 2009 dollars during 1990:Q1–1999:Q4) I find that, if prices are rounded
up at this estimated rate, consumers will lose an average of $118 million per quarter, or
about $2.36 billion over an average five-year period, which is in his estimated range.13 This
averages out to about a $1.60 cost to each consumer per year.14 If I consider the values
estimated in Whaples (2007), and conduct the same test as above, I find that the average
consumer would benefit by approximately 0.04 cents per year. Thus, my model fits the
results in the literature quite well. In any case, the cost or benefit to each consumer in these
events is negligible.
13$2.36 billion measured in 2009 dollars is approximately equivalent to $1.89 billion measured in 2000
dollars, the publication year of the menu costs in Lombra’s simulations. Thus, applying his results to my
model yields nearly the same conservative values he finds.
14In calculating these values, I multiply the values found in Table (1.3) by the quarterly personal consump-
tion expenditures and take the average. We then take this value and divide it by the average population at
the time.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper deviates from the literature through the use of a structural model. In doing so, I
find that the effects of eliminating a nation’s smallest unit of currency are insignificant, even
when considering shocks that are many times larger than those suggested in the literature.
While I consider the larger shock for expositional purposes, the model is robust to shocks
which correspond to those past estimates. Future inquiries can build on these results by
relaxing some of my base assumptions, such as a balanced government budget, or by con-
sidering a more intricate currency production process. The simplicity and robustness of this
model, however, makes it a good starting point for future debate on a growing issue. As
prices continue to rise gradually, the production and distribution of the penny will become
increasingly burdensome for the US government and taxpayers, implying a need for policy
change. The governments of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and others; facing the same
pressures; resorted to discontinuation of their smallest denominations. What will the US
government decide to do?
24
Table 1.4: Steady State Analysis Before and After Rounding Policiesa
Round Downb Round Upc
Variable Initial Value Value Change (%) Value Change (%)
Rich Household
Consumption, cot 0.2876 0.2878 0.0778 0.2874 −0.0783
Currency, not 0.0599 0.0597 −0.2490 0.0600 0.2502
Deposits, dt 0.6069 0.6069 0.0004 0.6069 −0.0004
Loans, lt 0.5856 0.5856 0.0004 0.5856 −0.0004
Hours, hot 0.3326 0.3326 0.0004 0.3326 −0.0004
Poor Household
Consumption, crt 0.2964 0.2967 0.0749 0.2962 −0.0754
Currency, nrt 0.3323 0.3307 −0.4988 0.3340 0.5013
Hours, hrt 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.3333 0.0000
Government
Spending, gt 0.0382 0.0380 −0.5947 0.0384 0.5946
Curr. Prod., npt 0.0043 0.0043 −0.3409 0.0043 0.3427
General Economy
Output, yt 0.4146 0.4146 0.0003 0.4146 −0.0003
Inflation, πt 1.0050 1.0050 0.0000 1.0050 −0.0000
Interest Rate, rt 1.0152 1.0152 0.0000 1.0152 −0.0000
Wage Rate, wt 0.9970 0.9970 −0.0001 0.9970 0.0001
a Recall that the shock I consider here is orders of magnitude larger than those estimated in
the literature. We do this for expositional purposes.
b Treasury policy parameter µ set to 1.005.
c Treasury policy parameter µ set to 0.995.
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Chapter 2
Inflation-Protected Taxes and Monetary
Dominance
2.1 Introduction
Beginning with Leeper (1991), the standard monetary/fiscal policy interaction literature
has considered lump sum tax rules based on government debt and/or spending. Analysis
is typically focused on significant shifts or underlying uncertainties in such policies.1 But
what about subtler fiscal policies such as changes to the basic structure of the tax code
itself? In this paper, I implant a labor income tax code derived from household income
levels within an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. This tax code is constructed
with actual legislation in mind. With it, I explore the impact of indexing the federal income
tax code for inflation. Viewing tax policy from a legislative perspective allows me to analyze
monetary and fiscal policy coordination while abstracting from fiscal sustainability issues
and the empirical estimation problems that follow. Since the Federal Income Tax Code
was indexed in 1985, estimating changes to this type of fiscal policy is unnecessary. Even
so, my model predicts a similar timeline for differing policy regimes as those who consider
1In addition to the example mentioned above, see Sims (1994), Woodford (2001), Davig and Leeper (2011)
and Leeper and Zhou (2013).
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the fiscal sustainability issues. Specifically, an indexed tax code yields the same “passive”
fiscal policy properties as seen in the literature.2 Only after the indexation of the tax
code is active monetary policy allowed to be dominant. Thus, active monetary policy and
an indexed income tax code are necessary conditions for stability. This implies that the
increased aggressiveness of the Volcker disinflation, nearly five years prior to the indexation
of the federal income tax code, was not sufficient in creating the period of relative stability
known as the Great Moderation. In fact, unilateral moves by either the monetary or fiscal
authorities would not have led to this period of tranquility.
2.1.1 A Legislative View of Policy Coordination
Sargent and Wallace (1981) show that there are situations in which the monetary authority
can be very limited in its control of inflation, even if the relationship between the monetary
base and the price level remains strong. Also called the fiscal theory of the price level, it
suggests that the central bank can be forced to cover the difference between the funds needed
for government spending and the public’s demand for government bonds through seignorage.
Thus, in this situation, fiscal policy governs inflation dynamics and essentially reverses the
standard interest rate channel. This model, along with those of Leeper (1991), Sims (1994),
and Woodford (2001), to name a few, focus on tax rate rules that are dependent on the level
of real outstanding government debt and government spending. However the federal income
tax code has remained relatively steady since the 1990s while debt has fluctuated (see Romer
and Romer, 2010). Figure 2.1 presents the legislated federal income tax code as average or
effective income tax rates for fixed, evenly spaced real income levels across the the period
1950 to 2011. These data are constructed by applying 200 synthesized real income levels to
the Federal Income Tax Code from 1950–2011 to calculate the real tax liability owed at each
income level. The effective rates are then calculated by dividing the liability by the income
level. This shows that the core of the tax code has remained relatively unaltered for the
2Though, as I mentioned, my tax rule is not a function of government debt, so a literal application of the
Leeper definition may be a stretch.
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last two decades, suggesting that fiscal policy may not be as passive as the literature would
suggest it is. For this purpose, I focus not on changing average lump sum taxes based on
debt and spending, but more on the tax code as it is structured in legislation.
One specific piece of legislation during this period changed the economic landscape: the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Not only did it reduce the top marginal federal income
tax rate from 70 to 50 percent, but it also established that this particular tax code would
be automatically indexed for inflation beginning in 1985. Indexation is a policy in which the
nominal bounds on the tax code brackets are adjusted annually for inflation.3 Doing so is
important even in low inflation economies because, without it, we get a phenomenon known
as bracket creep, which can be seen in Figure 2.1 especially in the high-inflation period of
1965-1980. This is the process by which a household ascends to higher tax liabilities when
its nominal income increases, even if the purchasing power of that income remains constant.
This causes the real disposable income of the household to fall over time.
As a more concrete example, consider a household in 1973 making $19,000 annually
(roughly $99,600 in 2014 dollars) and filing its taxes. Given that the consumer price index
increased by approximately 11% between 1973 and 1974 and assuming that this household
received an equivalent cost-of-living adjustment to their salary, the real value of their tax
liabilities increased, raising their effective tax rate from about 21.58% in 1973 to 22.42% in
1974. This is shown in more detail in Table 2.1. While this is a tailored exampled used to
make a point, this is bracket creep in its simplest form, causing real disposable income to
fall over time due to inflationary pressure. It is important to note that this example only
considers the change from one year to the next, but the entire period between 1965 and 1980
saw accelerating price levels, meaning that households could lose around one percent of their
disposable income every year. Again, refer to the effective tax rates for fixed real income
levels in Figure 2.1 to see how quickly tax liabilities can increase in a high inflation period.
More distinctly, we can show the changes in the effective tax rates over time for chosen
3There are other methods of indexing a tax code (see Thuronyi, 1996), but is the largest component and
thus is the focal point of this paper.
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Table 2.1: Changes in Tax Liabilities Due to Inflation: 1973–1974
1973 1974
Bracket Taxable Income Liability Taxable Income Liability
14% $1,000 $140 $1,000 $140
15% $1,000 $150 $1,000 $150
16% $1,000 $160 $1,000 $160
17% $1,000 $170 $1,000 $170
19% $4,000 $760 $4,000 $760
22% $4,000 $880 $4,000 $880
25% $4,000 $1,000 $4,000 $1,000
28% $3,000 $840 $4,000 $1,120
32% $0 $0 $1,092.25 $349.52
36% $0 $0 $0 $0
...
...
...
...
...
Total $19,000 $4,100 $21,092.52 $4,729.52
income levels. Figure 2.2 shows the movements in the effective tax rates for real incomes of
$40,000, $70,000, and $100,000 measured in 1982 dollars. The major changes in these time
series correspond to legislative alterations to the tax code. These include the initiation and
removal of the Vietnam War surtax in 1966 and 1969, respectively, as well as the adjustment
for bracket creep in 1976 and the major tax overhauls in 1981 and 1986. But notice that
there are persistent changes in these tax rates between the legislative adjustments. Outside
of the 1976 adjustment, tax rates rose steadily between 1970 and 1980. Depending on the real
income level, we see increases in tax liabilities of anywhere between 0.5 and 2.0 percentage
points per year. After 1984, the only tax rate changes are results of legislation, not bracket
creep.
Continuing this example at the macro-level, Table 2.2 shows a rough estimate of the addi-
tional tax revenue generated by inflation starting with the tax legislation of 1981 and prior to
the indexation in 1985. Equivalently, this can be viewed as the loss in real disposable income
to inflation. I construct this time series by first calculating the effective personal income tax
rates via nominal receipts from income taxes. I then apply them to their corresponding real
incomes calculated using the change in average hourly earnings. Since the new tax code and
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Table 2.2: Estimates of Additional Tax Revenue Due to Inflation
Year Effective Rate Additional Revenue
1981 11.0% $ 0.00 billion
1982 10.7% $16.27 billion
1983 9.7% $26.78 billion
1984 9.1% $36.91 billion
brackets were set in 1981, the additional revenue for the first year is null, but since prices
rose at a faster pace during this period, these additional tax receipts accumulated quickly,
even in the face of falling effective tax rates.4 While this is a rough estimate, these figures
are robust to multiple measures of income and wage inflation.
2.1.2 Volatility Reductions and the Timing of Indexation
At first, theories about the sudden fall in volatility were focused exclusively on monetary
policy. Works such as Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) suggested that there
was a dramatic shift in the way monetary policy was conducted. This break was considered
to come from one of two sources: a move from discretionary policy towards interest rate
rules or an increased aggressiveness against inflation if rules were already the norm. Other
explanations also surfaced, including Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Galí and Gambetti
(2009), which suggest a sudden, structural shift in the relationships between variables in the
economy. But even with all of the empirical evidence, Stock and Watson (2003) still estimate
that 40-60% of the cause remains unknown, prompting a title of “good luck.” By this, it is
generally meant that the variance of supply shocks has fallen dramatically since the 1980s.
Contrastingly Athanasios Orphanides and his coauthors dismissed the idea of discre-
tionary policy, citing faulty information as the culprit, finding persistent differences in the
real-time estimates of the output gap versus the revised measurements.5 This is typically
4The effective tax rates fell due to the fact that the tax reductions were imposed over multiple years, but
the brackets were established in 1981.
5A select few of this large literature include Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and Orphanides (2003,
2004).
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considered to be an effect of an unanticipated reduction in productivity growth, causing
estimates of the output gap to be lower than they truly were. If the Federal Reserve was
utilizing the output gap as a primary indicator of economic activity, large measurement er-
rors could easily derail monetary policy, making it seem discretionary. But as Orphanides
(2003) notes, there is a sudden reduction in this measurement error in the mid-1980s. For
this reason, this literature often refers to this period of high inflation and volatility as the
“Great Inflation.”6
In either case, the empirical work in this field suggests that the sudden reduction in
volatility occurred at about the same time as the indexation of the income tax code. Stock
and Watson (2003) narrow the literature’s results, saying that much of the evidence points
to a structural break in the first quarter of 1984. Considering the fact that tax laws are
annual by nature, if the tax code was first indexed for inflation in 1985, bracket creep would
have ended at the beginning of 1984, corresponding the the structural breaks found the in
the literature.
2.1.3 The Great Moderation as a Monetary and Fiscal Phenomenon
This paper ties together the monetary/fiscal-interaction and Great Moderation literatures.
Using time-varying parameter estimates, my model predicts a similar timeline of breaks in
model dynamics as Davig and Leeper (2011) and Bianchi (2012). However, many papers in
this line use sophisticated Markov-switching models to estimate regime changes within fiscal
policy. My model considers actual legislation, allowing me to pinpoint regime changes in
fiscal policy without estimation. This is a more realistic representation of the current income
tax code, which has not substantially changed since the early 1990s.
My model predicts that only the combination of active monetary policy and an indexed
tax code results in a unique solution, much like the active monetary/passive fiscal policy
prescriptions in the literature. Any unilateral policy shift results in either sunspot equilibria
6Similarly, Keating and Valcarcel (2012) consider this period a “blip” on the metaphorical radar, suggesting
that the Great Moderation may not have been the greatest.
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or explosive behavior. Extending my model by introducing a tax-labor productivity channel
results in a unique solution even in the non-indexed specification, while indexation leads to
decreases in variable volatilities and changes in variable correlations similar to the empirical
results found by Galí and Gambetti (2009) and others. Additionally, impulse response anal-
ysis suggests that bracket creep is a plausible cause of the labor productivity slowdown and
that indexation removed much of the noise from the data as described in Orphanides (2003).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 analyzes a standard New
Keynesian model with a progressive tax code, Section 2.3 presents the results, including
determinacy regions and application of the literature, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 New Keynesian Model with Tax Policy
Here I present a DSGE model with nominal price rigidities.7 The essence of my model much
like those used in Ireland (2004, 2012) and Belongia and Ireland (2012), but with a fiscal
agent which enlists an individual income tax code that depends on the households wage
income like those of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Chen and Guo (2013).
2.2.1 The Representative Household
In this model the representative household solves
max
{ct,ht}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ηpt ln ct −
1
ψ
hψt
)
, (2.1)
where ct and ht denote real consumption and labor hours, respectively. The parameters
β ∈ (0, 1) and ψ > 0 represent the subjective discount factor and the elasticity of substitu-
tion, respectively. The preference shock ηpt follows an autoregressive process in its natural
7See Woodford (2011); Galí (2009); and Rotemberg (1982) for details regarding this style of model and
nominal price rigidities.
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logarithm
ln ηpt = ρp ln η
p
t−1 + ε
p
t , (2.2)
such that ρp ∈ (0, 1) and εpt is an i.i.d. innovation with zero mean and constant variance
σp > 0. While solving (2.1), the household has to consider its own budget constraint. In
every period, the household earns income via the returns on nominal discount bonds Bt
purchased in the previous period; its disposable labor income, with Wt and τt representing
the nominal wage and tax rates, respectively; and revenues from dividend payments Dt. We
assume the household takes the tax rate τt as given since it is set by the fiscal authorities.8
This income is then divided between the purchase of real consumption goods ct at price Pt
and nominal bonds at price 1/rt, where rt is the gross nominal interest rate in the economy.
All of his yields the following budget constraint:
Ptct + Bt/rt ≤ Bt−1 + (1− τt)Wtht +Dt. (2.3)
Along with this budget constraint, the first order conditions are
ηpt
ct
= βrtEt
[
ηpt+1
ct+1
1
πt+1
]
(2.4)
and
Wt
Pt
=
hψ−1t ct
ηpt (1− τt)
, (2.5)
where
πt = Pt/Pt−1 (2.6)
is the gross inflation rate. Derivation of these optimization conditions can be found Appendix
B. As we can see, the Euler equation remains unaltered from the standard New Keynesian
models, but our intratemporal condition now depends on the labor income tax rate τt.
8The results of Guo and Lansing (1998) show that this specification does not change their determinacy
results.
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2.2.2 The Final Goods-Producing Firm
Like so many New Keynesian models, I consider a final good-producing firm which simply
aggregates the differentiable goods yt(i) for i ∈ [0, 1] produced by the continuum of inter-
mediate goods-producing firms for consumption by the households. It does so with a CES
production function
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ηst−1
ηst di
] ηst
ηst−1
,
where ηst is an exogenous process governing the elasticity of substitution. I consider innova-
tions to this as price markup shocks, which follow an autoregressive process in its natural
logarithm
ln ηst = (1− ρs) ln ηs + ρs ln ηst−1 + εst , (2.7)
where ρs ∈ (0, 1), ηs > 0, and εst is the i.i.d. innovation with zero mean and constant variance
σs > 0. The final goods-producing firm maximizes its profits in a perfectly competitive
market, yielding its demand for each intermediate good
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−ηst
yt, (2.8)
for all i ∈ [0, 1].
2.2.3 The Intermediate Goods-Producing Firms
As was mentioned above, there is a continuum of monopolisticly-competitive, intermediate
good-producing firms labeled by i ∈ [0, 1]. For simplification, we assume that all of these
firms face the same production technology given by
yt(i) ≤ ztht(i) (2.9)
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for all i, where zt is a labor-augmenting productivity process governed by
ln zt = (1− ρz) ln z + ρz ln zt−1 + εzt , (2.10)
such that z > 0, ρz ∈ [0, 1], and εzt is an i.i.d. innovation with zero mean and variance σz > 0.
I also introduce a Rotemberg (1982) cost of price adjustment
Φt(i) =
µ
2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
ct
for all i, which is measured in units of the consumption good. With µ ≥ 0 regulating the
magnitude, this cost of adjustment constraint makes these firms’ problems dynamic. I also
assume that all profits from these firms are remitted to dividends Dt(i), so that the profit
functions simplify to
Dt(i) = Pt(i)yt(i)−Wtht(i)− PtΦt(i) (2.11)
for all i. With this in mind, each intermediate goods-producing firm’s problem is given by
max
{Pt(i),ht(i),Dt(i)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
ηpt
ct
Dt(i)
Pt
, (2.12)
subject to constraints (2.8) and (2.11). The first term in (2.12) is the discounted marginal
utility value to the household of additional future profits. Each firm’s optimizing conditions
are therefore:
(1− ηst )
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst yt
Pt
+ ηst
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst−1 ytWt
ztP 2t
− µ
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
)
ct
πPt−1(i)
+ βµEt
[(
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)
− 1
)
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)2
ηpt+1ct
ηpt
]
= 0 (2.13)
for all i, which, when linearized, gives me a New Keynesian Philips Curve. A derivation of
these conditions can be found in Appendix B.
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2.2.4 The Fiscal Authority and the Labor Income Tax Code
The fiscal agent in this model is responsible each period for producing real government goods
gt and settling its debt from last period Bt−1. To do so, it sells nominal discount bonds Bt
at price 1/rt and collects tax revenue through a labor income tax. Considering this, the
government’s budget constraint is
Ptgt +Bt−1 ≤
Bt
rt
+ τtWtht. (2.14)
Similar to the specification used in Chen and Guo (2013), the effective labor income tax rate
τt evolves according to
τt = 1− θ
(
wh
wthtP
1n
t
)φ
(2.15)
where wt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage rate, θ ∈ [0, 1] dictates the steady state tax rate, φ ∈ (−1, 1),
and 1n is an indicator function that holds a value of one when the tax code is not indexed
for inflation and zero when it is indexed for inflation. I assume that, when the tax code is
set or adjusted, the price level index as it is related to the new tax code is reset to unity,
allowing me to omit a price level in the numerator. With τt representing the effective rate,
I define the marginal tax rate τmt to be the change to be the change in tax liability relative
to the change in labor income. This implies
τmt ≡
∂(τtwthtP
1n
t )
∂(wthtP
1n
t )
= τt + φθ
(
wh
wthtP
1n
t
)φ
. (2.16)
Thus, we can see that if φ > 0, the marginal tax rate at any given income level is greater
than the effective tax rate, which is the definition of a progressive tax code. If φ < 0, the
marginal rate is less than the effective rate at every level of income, which defines a regressive
tax code. Typical models in this literature assume income tax codes with φ = 0, in which
case the marginal tax rate and the effective tax rates are equal at all times. This is the
standard definition of a flat tax code. From another persepective, this parameter governs
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the labor income elasticity of the effective tax rate, given by
∂τt
∂(wthtP
1n
t )
wthtP
1n
t
τt
= φ
1− τt
τt
,
where, combining this with (2.16), we can see that setting φ = 0 will make the effective tax
rate and the marginal tax rate unresponsive to changes in the income level. When linearized,
(2.15) results in a tax policy similar to those in Leeper (1991) and Davig and Leeper (2011),
only this is a function of labor income, not government debt. Those models with no labor
income tax policy would be equivalent to setting φ = 0 and θ = 1.
Now let’s consider the theoretical impact of not indexing a labor income tax code. As-
suming that the general trend of the price index is upward, as has been historically, then at
any time after the price index is reset to one, Pt ≥ 1. If I also assume that the tax code is
progressive, as has been the case since its inception in 1913, then by (2.16), the model claims
(τmt − τt)
∣∣∣
1n=1
≤ (τmt − τt)
∣∣∣
1n=0
which implies that the tax code becomes less progressive (becomes “flatter”) as the price level
rises. This is intuitive since there is always a top marginal tax rate. Once a household’s
income reaches the top marginal rate, bracket creep will cause a larger percentage of said
income to fall into that top marginal bracket. The result is that the effective rate approaches
the marginal rate from below. While this model does not consider multiple households, the
distributional implications of a non-indexed tax code could be significant.
2.2.5 The Monetary Authority
The monetary policy rule considered here is standard in the literature:
ln
(rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(rt−1
r
)
+ ρπ ln
(
Et [πt+1]
π
)
+ ρx ln
(xt
x
)
+ εrt , (2.17)
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where ρr, ρπ, and ρx are all non-negative; r and π represent the steady state value of the
interest rate and target inflation rate respectively and εrt is an i.i.d. innovation to monetary
policy with zero mean and variance σr > 0. Also, I assume that the monetary authority
targets the output gap xt as measured using the efficient allocation. Thus, potential output
Qt is given as in Ireland (2004)
Qt = η
p
t
1/ψzt, (2.18)
which is a measure of output that varies only with the preference shock and productivity.
Considering this measure, the output gap xt is considered to be
xt =
yt
Qt
. (2.19)
See Appendix B for more details.
2.2.6 Symmetric Equilibrium
In equilibrium, I assume that the household and the intermediate goods-producing firms
solve their respective optimization problems and that the household does so with a binding
budget constraint. Since the production technology remains constant across the continuum
of intermediate goods-producing firms, I assume that they make identical decisions. Thus I
find that yt(i) = yt, Dt(i) = Dt, ht(i) = ht, and Pt(i) = Pt for all i ∈ (0, 1). I also assume
that there is no slack in the fiscal authority’s budget constraint and that Bt = 0 for all
t, implying a balanced budget in equilibrium. With these assumptions, my model reduces
to equations (2.2)–(2.7), (2.9)–(2.11), (2.13)–(2.15), and (2.17)–(2.19) which can be used to
solve for the following 15 variables: ηpt , ηst , zt, Pt, πt, ct, ht,Wt, yt, Dt, rt, xt, gt, τt, Qt. As was
done already for the tax code with nominal wages, I can express dividends in real terms by
dividing by the price level, giving me dt ≡ Dt/Pt. Doing this for both the nominal wage rate
and the dividends ensures that the model’s variables, outside of the unit root in the price
level itself, will be stationary.
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2.2.7 The Linearized Model
Since the model contains a tax code that may or may not be indexed for inflation, it is
important to linearize the model and possibly analyze permanent shifts in the variables.
Let the “∼” signify each respective variable’s deviation in natural logarithm from its steady
state, which we express as the variable without a time subscript. Below is the full list of
log-linearized equations.
cc̃t = (1− τ)wh(w̃t + h̃t)− τwhτ̃t + dd̃t
η̃pt − c̃t = r̃t + Et
[
η̃pt+1 − c̃t+1 − π̃t+1
]
w̃t = (ψ − 1)h̃t + c̃t − η̃pt +
τ
1− τ
τ̃t
π̃t = P̃t − P̃t−1
ỹt = z̃t + h̃t
dd̃t = yỹt − wh(w̃t + h̃t)
π̃t = βEt[π̃t+1] +
ηswy
µzc
(w̃t − z̃t) +
ηsy
µc
(w
z
− 1
)
η̃st
g̃t = τ̃t + w̃t + h̃t
τ̃t =
1− τ
τ
φ(w̃t + h̃t + 1nP̃t)
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 + ρπEt[π̃t+1] + ρxx̃t + εrt
Q̃t =
1
ψ
η̃pt + z̃t
x̃t = ỹt − Q̃t
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z̃t = ρz z̃t−1 + ε
z
t
Notice that, when the tax code is not indexed for inflation (1n = 1), the price level
appears in the tax code, which then makes it appear in the New Keynesian Philips curve.
If the monetary authority does not target the price level, then all transitory shocks will
have a permanent effect. Another important component of this model is the feedback effect
between the tax rate and the wage rate. As the tax rate rises, it puts upward pressure on
the wage rate, which then causes the tax rate to rise (holding labor hours constant). Thus,
the natural drift in the prices causes explosive behavior through a wage rate channel. Two
fiscal policy changes can eliminate the permanent effects of these shocks. The first is by
simply indexing the tax code for inflation (1n = 0), at which point the price level term falls
out of the Philips curve. The second is by considering a flat tax rate (φ = 0), where the tax
rate does not move regardless of whether it is indexed or not. This is the typical assumption
in most models that consider taxation and, as can be seen in the equations, will negate the
price level term. Considering the legislative history of the United States, a flat tax rate has
never been used, though income taxes were indexed for inflation in 1985.9
2.3 Results
In this section I present the solution process and results of the model outlined in section
2.2. I begin by parameterizing the model. The structural components of the model are
calibrated in a simple fashion, while the parameters that guide the exogenous processes are
set by matching moments with the literature. I then present the steady state solutions for
the model’s variables and analyze the general dynamic properties with determinacy regions.
Using these regions, I then apply the data to the model to find the probability of obtaining
a determinant solution to my model across time.
9It is worth noting that the federal income tax was adopted with the Sixteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in 1913. Prior to this, Article I, Section 8 required that any taxes be imposed uniformly,
making income taxes unpopular.
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2.3.1 Parameter Calibration
In order to solve the model above, specific values must be assigned to the 17 parameters in
the model: β, ψ, π, µ, θ, φ, ηs, ρp, ρs, ρz, ρr, ρπ, ρx, σp, σs, σr, and σz. A summary table of
the parameter values can be found in Table (2.3). Since r = 1/β in steady state, I calibrate
the subjective discount factor β to match the fact that the average annual effective federal
funds rate was approximately five percent from 1955 to 2013, which sets it at 0.95. I then set
the steady state inflation target to π = 1. While, this is not very realistic, it keeps the model
Table 2.3: Base Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Subjective Discount Factor β 0.95
Elasticity of Substitution ψ 0.181
Cost of Price Adjustment µ 13.25
Steady State Inflation Rate π 1.00
Level of the Tax Code θ 0.90
Progression of the Tax Code φ 0.15
Elasticity of Demand ηs 6.00
Smoothing Response ρr 0.75
Inflation Response ρπ 0.35
Output-Target Response ρy 0.15
Preference Shock Persistence ρp 0.50
Technology Shock Persistence ρz 0.85
Cost-Push Shock Persistence ρs 0.50
Preference Shock St. Dev. σp 0.01
Elasticity Shock St. Dev. σs 0.01
Productivity Shock St. Dev. σz 0.01
Monetary Policy Shock St. Dev. σr 0.0025
stationary from being explosive in all situations when the tax code is not indexed (1n = 1),
providing a basis for analysis. As for the tax code, much of my analysis will involve analyzing
the dynamics of the model as θ and φ are adjusted. But for those situations requiring fixed
values, I calibrate these parameters to be the average of time-varying estimates described
in more detail in section 2.3.4.2 below. Doing so implies that these parameters are about
θ = 0.90 and φ = 0.15, ensuring that the labor income tax code is progressive. Setting
41
ηs = 6, as in Ireland (2004, 2012), fixes the steady state markup of price over marginal
cost at 20%. Similarly, I set the level of price adjustment as is done in King and Watson
(1996) and Ireland (2000). These papers suggest that discrepancies between the current
price level and the desired price level are eliminated at about a 10% per quarter rate. Given
that this is an annual model, I assume a 40% reduction per year, which implies a value of
µ = 13.25. For the remaining structural parameters, I calibrate the household’s elasticity of
labor substitution to be ψ = 0.181, pinning labor hours at h = 0.330 and suggesting that
households work approximately 1/3 of their day.
2.3.2 Steady State
Given the calibrated parameters above, the steady state values can be solved analytically.
Since I assume that the steady state price level is set to one, the indexed and non-indexed
models are identical in steady state. I also normalize output to equal one, just as a simpli-
Table 2.4: Steady State Values of the Model Variables
Variable Value
Real Output yt 1.0
Real Consumption ct 0.9175
Real Government Spending gt 0.0825
Productivity zt 3.0303
Tax Rate τt 0.10
Nominal Interest Rate rt 1.05
Real Wage Rate wt 2.5
Labor Hours ht 0.330
Real Dividends dt 0.1750
fication. With this, I find that government spending is 8.25% of total output in the model.
While this is less than the data-recommended average of 20%, it is calculated using the es-
timated tax parameters. Another reason to consider this as accurate is that my model only
incorporates income taxes, which would make government spending less.
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2.3.3 Determinacy Regions
An economic model is said to be determinant if it has a unique solution. The figures below
map out not only the determinant areas, but also those parameter spaces which yield an
infinite number of solutions and no solution.10 The first example, shown in Figure 2.6,
looks at the interaction between the fiscal and monetary policy parameters governing the
progressiveness of the tax code φ and the reaction to inflation ρπ , seeing how they work
together when the tax code is not indexed for inflation. Due to the permanency of the shocks,
only a flat or regressive tax code (φ ≤ 0) yields a unique solution to the model. Otherwise
the economy will either find itself in a situation of sunspots (infinite solutions) or explosive
behavior (no solution). Intuitively, the next question to ask is if the monetary authority can
overcome the problems associated with a non-indexed tax code through some combination
of inflation and output gap targeting. Figure 2.7 shows that monetary policy makers cannot
push the economy to a region of determinacy, at least within the empirically plausible set
of parameter values. Though my tax rule does not consider outstanding government debt,
these properties are nearly identical to the situation of active fiscal policy in Leeper (1991)
and Davig and Leeper (2011), where passive monetary policy creates sunspot equilibria and
active policy leads to explosive behavior.
If the tax code is indexed for inflation, such as it was after 1985, the results are drastically
different. Figure 2.8 shows, again, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, but
this time the tax code is indexed. Now there is very little tradeoff between monetary and
fiscal policy. At this point, as long as monetary policy is active, the model predicts a
determinant, stable solution. With this in mind, how should monetary policy conduct itself
to ensure a unique solution? In Figure 2.9 the determinacy regions look fairly similar to those
of standard models with slight alterations due to a progressive tax code. For the most part,
simply adhering to the Taylor Principle provides the needed unique solution, which again
is similar to the dynamic properties explored in the literature when fiscal policy is passive.
10See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for further discussion of causes and implications of each type of result.
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Thus, the indexation of the tax code can be viewed as fiscal policy becoming passive, allowing
monetary policy to dictate inflation dynamics.
2.3.4 Assessing the Probability of a Determinant Solution
Now that the determinacy regions have been mapped, I consider the values of the policy pa-
rameters and the dynamic properties they incur. I start with a simple two-period breakdown,
applying estimates generated in the literature. I then extend this so that the parameters are
time varying, allowing my model to predict exactly when these dynamic changes occurred.
2.3.4.1 The Two-Period Case
The literature considered here is Clarida et al. (2000), which estimates an interest rate rule
similar to that in this model for both the pre- and post-Great Moderation periods. Then,
Table 2.5: Solution Probabilities Based on Estimates from the Literature: Clarida
et al. (2000)
Tax Code Not Indexed Tax Code Indexed
Infinite Unique Explosive Infinite Unique Explosive
Pre-Volcker 64.35 0.03 35.62 99.36 0.64 0.00
Volcker-Greenspan 0.08 1.27 98.64 0.22 99.78 0.00
taking the estimates given, I draw 50,000 times from normal distributions and apply the
resulting parameter values to the model, using the log-linearized version of the model in
Dynare for efficiency purposes.11 Table 2.5 lays out the resulting probabilities as well as the
probabilities associated with related counterfactuals. Once again, I find that the increased
probability of a unique solution is not solely a monetary policy phenomenon, but also relies
on fiscal policy via indexation. Simply increasing the aggressiveness of monetary policy in
the Volcker era would have only moved the economy into a parameter space that results in
explosive behavior (active monetary and fiscal policy), but the indexation of the tax code
11Dynare version 4.4.0 with Matlab version R2011a for Mac.
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eliminated fiscal policy from having a major impact on the dynamics of the economy, giving
monetary policy control and producing a unique solution (active monetary/passive fiscal
policy). Monetary policy makers had the right idea, but they needed fiscal policy makers to
do their part as well.
2.3.4.2 A Time-Varying Parameter Extension
To see how these policies played out over time, I extend the above analysis to incorporate
time-varying parameters for both the fiscal and monetary policy side.
Estimation Methods The tax policy used in the model contains two structural param-
eters (φ, θ) which determine the progressiveness and the steady state effective income tax
rate in the economy. To get an idea of where these parameters lie, I replicate the results of
Chen and Guo (2013) for each year starting in 1950 and ending in 2011. I consider 1,000
nominal incomes spread evenly between $1 and $400,000, which is roughly the cutoff for the
bottom 99% of income earners today. Using the nominal income tax brackets from the tax
code in each year, I calculate the total tax liability at each income level. Dividing this value
by the synthesized taxable income level yields the average income tax rate for each income
level. Figure 2.3 shows how these average tax rates progressed for selected years. As can be
seen, the progressiveness of the tax code has steadily fallen since World War II.
Using the values gathered for each year, I then use OLS to estimate the natural logarithm
of my tax model
ln(1− τ) = ln θ + φ ln
(
Y ∗
Y
)
,
where Y are the 1,000 nominal income values and Y ∗ is the average taxable income in each
year, calculated by taking the total taxable income divided by the number of individual
tax returns filed in that year.12 Doing this for every year gives us time-varying parameter
12This data can be found in the SOI Tax Stats of the US Internal Revenue Service, specifically Historical
Tables 8 and 9.
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estimates for the tax code. Figure 2.4 shows these estimates from 1966 to 2011.13 These
estimates show that, while the average tax rate (1 − θ) didn’t change much over the years,
the progressiveness of the tax code did. These estimates capture the substantial high-income
tax cuts in 1981 and in 1986, as well as the surtaxes of the late-1960s.
For the monetary policy parameters, I consider a Kalman filter using data on the effective
federal funds rate, the inflation rate as calculated by CPI, and the output gap calculated
by taking the ratio of GDP to potential GDP.14 The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm
that estimates an unobserved-state vector. Since interest rates, inflation, and the output
gap are known, I can used the data to estimate the unobserved monetary policy parameters
β = [ρr ρπ ρx]
′ across time. Following the process as explained by Kim and Nelson (1999), I
obtain time-varying estimates of these parameters. For this model, I consider the state space
model, where the measurement equation is the interest rate rule given by (2.17), where I
make a simplifying assumption that expected inflation rate is equal to the current period’s
inflation rate. The transition equation, since I am considering policy parameters, is assumed
to be a random walk. In matrix notation,
rt = Xtβt + ε
r
t ε
r
t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σr)
βt = βt−1 + υt υt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, Q)
where Xt = [rt−1 πt xt] and all variables are natural logarithm form. For the initial
estimates, I use the adapted pre-Volcker estimates from Clarida et al. (2000), giving me
β0|0 = [0.68 0.2656 0.086]
′ . The prediction phase of the filter considers the random walk
assumption so that βt|t−1 = βt−1|t−1. Predicting the covariance matrix of the parameters Vt
also becomes simple, such that Vt|t−1 = Vt−1|t−1 +Q. From these, I can assess the prediction
13The years prior to 1966 yielded values of θ in excess of one, which is not plausible for the model considered
here. Because of this, I simply cut off my estimates where Chen and Guo (2013) did. Somewhat of a concern
is the sensitivity of these estimates to the number of sample points within the fixed income bounds.
14Even though the Federal Reserve currently considers the personal consumption expenditures price index
for its inflation targets, it has only done so since 2000. Prior to this it used the consumer price index.
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error ηt|t−1 = rt − Xtβt|t−1 and its conditional variance ft|t−1 = XtVt|t−1X
′
t + σ
r. Knowing
the prediction error and its variance, I then update my parameter estimates
βt|t = βt|t−1 + Vt|t−1X
′
tf
−1
t|t−1ηt|t−1
and my conditional variance estimates
Vt|t = Vt|t−1 − Vt|t−1X
′
tf
−1
t|t−1XtVt|t−1.
The term Vt|t−1X
′
tf
−1
t|t−1 is the weight assigned to new information when updating my esti-
mates, commonly called the Kalman gain. Continuing to do this for all t yields the time-
varying parameter estimates. Additionally, we can obtain smoothed parameter estimates by
updating our original estimates given all the information. If I denote the final period of the
sample as T , the smoothed estimates adhere to the recursive algorithm
βt|T = βt|t+ Vt|tV −1t+1|t(βt+1|T − βt|t)
Vt|T = Vt|t + Vt|tV
−1
t+1|t(Vt+1|T − Vt+1|t)V
−1
t+1|t
′
V
′
t|t
for all t. In this case, I work backwards from t = T to t = 0, instead of forwards like I
did for the original estimates. Figure 2.5 provides the smoothed results with one standard
deviation confidence bands. With these values, I now have a complete rendering of monetary
and fiscal policy through the entire sample period.
Applying the Parameters to the Model Figure 2.10 shows the time-varying proba-
bilities across the entire sample period as in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011). To be as
thorough as possible, for each year I draw 10,000 times from normal distributions for the
monetary policy parameters and utilize the time-varying tax code estimates from Figure 2.4,
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again plugging them into the log-linearized model and solving via Dynare.15 Again, notice
that while the probability of sunspot equilibria is very similar in the non-indexed and indexed
models, the remaining probabilities go in opposite directions. For the non-indexed model,
the increased reaction by monetary policy makers to inflation in the late-1970s results in
explosive behavior in the economy.16 As for the indexed model, the added aggression yields
determinacy in the economy. Thus, the model predicts that monetary policy makers did not
achieve stability in 1979. Rather, they had to wait for fiscal policy to catch up and index
the income tax code in 1985, which matches the estimated break in volatility in the Great
Moderation literature.17 Additionally, these results are directly comparable to the timetable
presented in Davig and Leeper (2011, Figure 1), which uses a Markov-switching model and a
tax policy that targets real outstanding government debt. This suggests that the estimates
found in this regime-switching literature may be picking up subtle changes in fiscal policy
such as the indexation of the tax code.
2.4 Adding a Fiscal Policy Channel to the Model
The model given in section 2.2 is a fairly standard model, but this poses a problem when
considering policies that can cause explosive behavior. To get around this and further my
analysis of this policy, I introduce a fiscal policy channel through labor productivity. It
implies that rising tax rates will cause productivity to decrease, a concept that is in no way
new to the empirical literature, but is universally abstracted from in the theoretical litera-
ture. Vartia (2008) provides an extensive review of the empirical literature, which typically
15Use of only the fiscal policy estimates is done for two reasons. First, drawing from the fiscal policy
parameter distributions dramatically increases the dimensions of this analysis, resulting in an immense
amount of computing time. Second, the fact that the estimates of θ are very close to its upper bound
suggests that drawing randomly from an assumed distribution would cause more problems that it would
solve.
16In Figure 2.4 the non-smoothed parameter results show a large jump in inflation reaction, while the
smoothed results suggests increased persistence. Both results yield similar probabilities.
17Also realize that the tax brackets were first adjusted in 1985, which means the effect of indexation,
specifically the elimination of bracket creep, began in 1984, exactly matching the estimated starting period
of the Great Moderation in the literature.
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considers the implications of various taxes on entrepreneurial activity and research and de-
velopment. She then finds a negative relationship between top marginal personal income
tax rates and total factor productivity, which she claims is also through this entrepreneurial
channel. Carroll et al. (2001) also finds that high marginal income tax rates can hurt pro-
ductivity, especially the growth rates of small firms. Since my model only considers labor
income taxes charged to households, this channel could be considered a Laffer channel in
which increasing tax rates may cause the tax base to fall through falling productivity, re-
ducing overall tax revenues. To model this, I simply add a tax component to the otherwise
exogenous process in equation (2.10)
ln zt = (1− ρz) ln z + ρz ln zt−1 − ρτz ln
(τt
τ
)
+ εzt , (2.20)
with ρτz ≥ 0. This matches the empirical results that increasing tax rates reduces labor
productivity. Interestingly, Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) show that micro-level estimates
of labor supply elasticity to tax rates are much lower than their macro-level counterparts,
suggesting that this channel is stronger in the aggregate sense.18 While I do not consider
this channel for the baseline analysis in section 2.3, it adds a dynamic to New Keynesian
models that most do not contain, making productivity a partly endogenous variable.
One issue modeling this channel in this way is that the parameter ρτz is hard to pin down.
The closest empirical analysis that applies to a channel modeled in this way is Bloom et al.
(2000), in which they estimate the short-run user cost of capital elasticity to taxes to be -0.1,
while the long-run estimate is closer to -1.0. Since this is the closest I can currently get, I
calibrate ρτz = 0.10 which means, in a linearized model, that only about ten percent of the
deviation in the tax rate from its steady state directly impacts productivity. I choose this
value leaning towards the more conservative side. As was mentioned earlier, Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009) find that estimates of labor supply elasticity to tax rates are lower at the
18For a more in depth look at the entrepreneurial channel, see Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Carroll,
Holtz-Eakin, Rider and Rosen (2000, 2001).
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micro level than at the macro level, so this calibration of ρτz should be fair.
The expansion of the model to include this channel is done for three reasons. Considering
the strong assumptions on the tax code and the somewhat outside-the-box results that follow,
this allows for another plausible angle with which to tackle this debate. Suggesting that there
was no way for monetary policy makers to induce determinacy in the economy without an
indexed tax code is a strong statement, so coming at the question from a different direction
should only strengthen the argument. The second reason behind this arrangement is that,
as shown in Section 2.4.1 below, introducing this channel makes the model stationary in
both of the active monetary policy scenarios, allowing us to analyze variances, correlations,
and impulse responses, which are key for this type of analysis. The third reason is simply
because there is a literature that suggests this is an empirically viable channel, whether it is
strong or not. Analysis of the model shows that any value of ρτz > 0 results in stationarity, so
this is not a question of how strong the channel is.19 The data suggests this channel exists,
so it is something worth exploring.
2.4.1 The Impact of this Fiscal Channel on the Model
If the entrepreneurial channel is active (ρτz > 0) the model becomes completely stationary
when the tax code is not indexed for inflation, regardless of monetary policy. This is because
the output gap (which is a function of the tax rate) becomes a function of the price level,
making monetary policy makers implicitly target the price level. If the tax code is indexed,
the price level falls out of the interest rate rule and the monetary policy component of my
model is equivalent to those in much of the monetary policy literature. Thus, as it is with
fiscal policy, from a monetary policy standpoint, this model is a generalized version of other
models. As is presented below, the inclusion of this channel directly impacts the volatility
in the model, the correlations between variables, and the variance decompositions.
19Though larger values of ρτz do produce much quicker returns of the variable to steady state.
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2.4.2 Impulse Responses
In this section I present the impulse responses for the expanded model, considering both the
indexed and non-indexed situation. For conciseness, I present only the results for negative
monetary policy, positive productivity, and positive demand shocks. The impulse responses
in Figure 2.11 depict output growth, the output gap, productivity, and the tax rate. The
first thing to notice is that, since not indexing the tax code causes the monetary authority to
implicitly target the price level along with targeting inflation, the impulse response functions
are damped oscillations instead of monotonically converging. The second thing to notice is
that, while the dynamics of output growth do not change much from one scenario to the
other, the change in the dynamics of the output gap, an input into the interest rate rule, is
quite large, especially when it comes to monetary policy shocks.
An important interpretation of a monetary policy shock is a measurement error of one
or more of the input arguments. Orphanides (2003) considers a simple interest rate rule like
the one below targeting inflation and the output gap and introduces noisy information in
both inputs (επt , εxt ) respectively
rt − r = γ(πt − π) + δxt − [(1− γ)επt + δεxt ],
showing that measurement error can derail even theoretically sound monetary policy. When
comparing this rule to (2.17), the term in brackets can be defined to be εrt , implying that a
negative monetary policy shock can be likened to a measurement error that causes monetary
policy makers to lower interest rates further than needed. With this intuitive theory, Or-
phanides (2003, 2004) concludes that the perceived passivity of monetary policy was caused
more by mismeasurement of productivity growth than discretionary policy. Looking at the
impulse response, I find that a measurement error of this type actually has a larger negative
impact on productivity when the tax code is not indexed for inflation. This, in turn, leads
to output gap levels that are higher than originally reported, which was the case during the
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“Great Inflation,” where ex-post estimates of the output gap were much larger than their
original counterparts. If this is not taken into consideration, an initial measurement error
can, in theory, lead to further measurement errors, causing interest rates to be low for too
long and cause elevated levels of inflation, just as was evident in the 1970s. Additionally, the
interest rate response to a technology (productivity) shock in Figure 2.12 shows the differ-
ence in monetary policy responses when the tax code is not indexed. In this case, instead of
interest rates rising with inflation, they fall with the output gap. Supply shocks were large
and occurred often during the 1970s, so if bracket creep was causing measurement error,
then the situation is the same as that implied in the equation above.
Extending on this idea, notice that the response of productivity (output gap) always ends
up lower (higher) when the tax code is not indexed for inflation. So if the monetary author-
ities are estimating the state of the economy via the black line, they are under-estimating
the output gap. Recall that this is an annual model, which means the under-estimation
can actually last for long periods of time. Add in the measurement errors after the initial
shocks, and policy makers can easily compound the effects of the initial shock, whether it be
a supply- or demand-side shock.20 These results imply that inflation-induced bracket creep,
while subtle, is a plausible explanation for measurement errors in labor productivity during
this time period.
Figure 2.13 presents some additional impulse responses. Here we can see that, after
indexation, the response of real disposable income (1 − τt)wtht greatly increases. This is
a testament to the impact of bracket creep on households. Having a tax code that allows
a household’s tax liabilities to drift upward results in an erosion of its purchasing power.
Additionally, the impact on government spending shows how revenues τtwthtP 1nt were im-
20The evidence suggests that the influence of a non-indexed tax code was not taken into consideration. The
only mention of “bracket creep" by the Board of Governors shows up in short conversation in the transcript
of the FOMC Meeting for December 21, 1981, after the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had been passed
into law. This suggests that, while they may have been aware of it, they may not have considered it as a
major factor in their policy decisions. Thus, when considering these measurement errors, they easily could
have thought the economy was following the black line, while the economy was actually following the blue
line.
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pacted. Since this model assumes a balanced budget, the fiscal authority can only spend
what it brings in through tax revenues. Considering the indexed (1n = 0) and non-indexed
(1n = 1) models are identical in steady state, its fairly intuitive that the initial impacts on
revenues are similar. The bracket creep, however, shows up in the increased persistence of
government spending. Although the tax rate is falling back to steady state, it happens more
gradually because the price level has to adjust as well. This provides a boost to government
revenues for a longer period of time, something that is well known by those familiar with
the impact of bracket creep.
It is also worth noting that the decreased impact of non-technology shocks on productivity
matches the general empirical results found in Galí and Gambetti (2009) without adjusting
the aggressiveness of monetary policy. To an extent the impulse responses for output to
non-technology shocks also match after the immediate impact, which are very similar in
each scenario. Finally, technology shocks have less of an impact on output growth in the
indexed model than they do in the non-indexed version. Thus, it would not necessarily take
smaller shocks to induce a reduced volatility, as the “good luck” theorists claim.
2.4.3 Structural Changes in the Theoretical Moments
The important findings regarding the Great Moderation typically consider the theoretical
moments of certain variables as well as the correlations between them. Tables 2.6 and 2.7
present the changes in standard deviations and correlations between differenced output, labor
hours, and productivity along with whether the directions of these shifts match those found
by Galí and Gambetti (2009) and Stiroh (2009). As can be seen, the results presented in this
model match those found empirically in the literature outside of the change in labor hours.
The difference there can at least partially be attributed to the overly simple modeling of
the production process.21 Otherwise, we see a decrease in the standard deviation of output
growth and productivity growth.
21For example, the labor market matching literature provides a simple approach to modeling a more
accurate labor market, but I consider this beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 2.6: Standard Deviations of Se-
lected Variables
Non-Indexed Indexed Matcha
∆yt 0.0060 0.0053 Yes
∆ht 0.0099 0.0104 No
∆zt 0.0101 0.0097 Yes
a This column refers to whether the move-
ments in each variable’s standard deviation
matches the movements in Galí and Gam-
betti (2009).
Similarly, I find that the correlation between output growth and productivity growth,
as well as that between labor hours and productivity growth, fall. This also matches the
empirical results found in the literature. Again, the correlation between output growth and
the growth in labor hours does not match, but a more developed labor market could change
that. For the most part, the changes in theoretical moments and variable interactions within
this simple, generalized model of monetary-fiscal interaction match what has been found in
the data, all without changing the parameters of either the interest rate rule or the tax rule.
Table 2.7: Correlations of Selected Variables
Non-Indexed Indexed Matcha
∆yt,∆ht 0.2663 0.3698 No
∆ht,∆zt -0.8227 -0.8602 Yes
∆yt,∆zt 0.3283 0.1556 Yes
a This column refers to whether the movements in
each variable’s standard deviation matches the
movements in Galí and Gambetti (2009).
One last result is the fall in the contribution of all supply shocks with the indexation of
the tax code. While this does not match that of Galí and Gambetti (2009), it does match
the results presented in Arias et al. (2007). This again suggests that the theory that supply
shocks are simply smaller now may be flawed.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
While much of the monetary/fiscal policy coordination literature considers lump sum tax
policies structured around real outstanding government debt, this paper takes a more legisla-
tive approach. Implanting a labor income tax code structured around income levels into an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model, I analyze the dynamic impacts of indexing such
a tax code for inflation. This type of policy was implemented in the federal income tax code
in 1985, eliminating bracket creep in the process. Though this policy has been overlooked
in the literature, my model predicts that it had a substantial impact on the dynamics of the
economy. Specifically, an indexed tax code yields the same dynamic properties as “passive”
fiscal policy in the Leeper (1991) sense. Without indexation, my model predicts that the ac-
tive monetary policy enacted in the late 1970s would have produced and active/active policy
scenario which results in explosive behavior. Only after the indexation of the tax code was
monetary policy allowed to be dominant, providing determinacy in the model at the precise
moment suggested in the Great Moderation literature. Thus, the reduction in volatility seen
in the data was not simply a monetary-policy phenomenon, but a combination of movements
from both sides of policy. One change without the other would not have resulted in the pe-
riod of tranquility seen in the late-1980s through the mid-2000s. This timeline of events
matches that found in the Markov-switching model estimates of Davig and Leeper (2011),
suggesting that their estimates may have been picking up this subtle fiscal policy change.
While some in the literature find the same timeline as my model suggests, the drawback of
these regime-switching models is the interpretation of the estimated shifts. My model gets
around this by focusing on specific legislation, providing easy interpretation of what actually
happened.
Extending the model to include a fiscal policy channel through productivity, I find that
the productivity slowdown and associated output gap mismeasurement suggested by Or-
phanides (2003) may have had its roots in bracket creep. Increasing tax rates caused by
bracket creep put downward pressure on labor productivity, causing any shocks to the model
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to have substantially larger impacts on productivity and the output gap. Had monetary
policy makers not considered the impacts of bracket creep, their estimates of the output
gap would be much lower than the true value, which was exactly the case in the mid-1970s.
Thus, any initial measurement error is compounded, resulting in seemingly discretionary
monetary policy when considering revised variable estimates. Even when holding monetary
policy as active, indexation of the tax code results in decreased standard deviations of key
variables discussed in the literature. This policy also alters the structural relationships be-
tween the variables in the same manner as those explored in the literature. This includes
the correlations between variables such as output growth and productivity growth as well
as reducing the impact of supply shocks on the economy. Thus, this policy may have also
reduced the impact of supply shocks, which would debunk the “good luck” theories of the
Great Moderation.
All of these results stem from a fiscal policy that does not consider large changes in gov-
ernment spending or big swings in the tax rates, which are the focus of most of the literature.
This policy, on the other hand considers a change in how the tax code is implemented, re-
vealing substantial impacts on the model dynamics. Thus, maybe we should be less worried
about the big-ticket policies, and a little more interested in some of these subtler policies. For
example, an extension to this paper is to consider the impact of monetary and fiscal policy
makers utilizing differing measurements of inflation. The Federal Reserve began targeting
inflation based on the personal consumption expenditure price index, while the taxes and
transfer payments of the US Government are still indexed using the consumer price index.
Do subtleties in monetary and fiscal policy such as indexation or the use of differing inflation
measurements have significant impacts on the economy? Maybe these are the questions we
should be asking.
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Figure 2.1: Time series of effective tax rates for 24 evenly-spaced, synthesized real income levels
between $10,000 and $2 million from 1950-2012 considering only the legislated, federal personal
income tax code.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage point change in legislated effective labor income tax rates for selected
real incomes measured in 1982 dollars.
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Figure 2.3: The effective labor income tax code for selected years.
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Figure 2.4: Tax Code Parameters Estimated with Ordinary Least Squares: 1966–2011
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Figure 2.5: Smoothed Time-Varying Monetary Policy Parameters
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
 A
g
g
re
s
s
iv
e
n
e
s
s
: ρ
π
Progressiveness of Tax Policy: φ
Unique Solution
No Solution
Infinite Solutions
Figure 2.6: Monetary-Fiscal Interaction Determinacy Regions: Tax Code Not Indexed for Inflation
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Figure 2.7: Monetary Policy Determinacy Regions with Fiscal Policy Held Constant: Tax Code
Not Indexed for Inflation
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Figure 2.8: Fiscal-Monetary Interaction Determinacy Regions: Tax Code Indexed for Inflation
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Figure 2.9: Monetary Policy Determinacy Regions with Fiscal Policy Held Constant: Tax Code
Indexed for Inflation
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Figure 2.10: Time-Varying Probabilities of Solution Possibilities Considering both Monetary and
Fiscal Policy
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Figure 2.11: Selected Impulse Responses
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Figure 2.12: Selected Impulse Responses
62
0 20 40
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Labor Hours
P
o
lic
y
 S
h
o
c
k
0 20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Wage Rate
0 20 40
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Disp. Real Income
0 20 40
−1
0
1
2
Gov. Spending
0 20 40
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 S
h
k
0 20 40
−1
0
1
2
0 20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
0 20 40
−1
0
1
2
3
0 20 40
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
D
e
m
a
n
d
 S
h
o
c
k
0 20 40
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0 20 40
−0.5
0
0.5
1
0 20 40
−1
0
1
2
3
 
 
Not Indexed Indexed
Figure 2.13: Selected Impulse Responses
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Chapter 3
Broad Inflation and Monetary/Fiscal
Coordination
3.1 Introduction
Beginning in the mid-2000s, a small group outside the policy-making circle began to critique
the Federal Reserve for what they believed to be an overly-loose stance. The reason behind
this dissent began when the federal funds rate reached one percent in June 2003, the lowest
level since the late 1950s, and remained there until well into 2004 as shown in Figure (3.1).
This opinion reached headline proportions in the midst of the financial crisis, where the
source of the housing bubble was assumed to be low borrowing costs driven by excessively
easy money. At best, they saw it as a combination of short-term deviations from a Taylor
(1993) rule due to high levels of uncertainty and risk exogenous to a model (Alcidi et al.,
2011). At worst, they viewed it as a deliberate deviation from the rule which directly caused
the housing bubble and subsequent collapse (Taylor, 2009; McDonald and Stokes, 2013).
However, there are two inconsistencies with these conclusions. First, most of these anal-
yses utilize revised data in their policy rule estimates instead of real-time data. Orphanides
(2003) shows that the use of revised data can be quite deceiving when discussing the efficacy
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Figure 3.1: Target Federal Funds Rate
Note: Quarterly data of the target federal funds rate is provided above along with economic
recessions (shaded area), defined as the periods between dates designated as peak and trough
provided by the NBER.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the National Bureau of Economic Research
of past decisions. Orphanides and Wieland (2008) correct for this and find that monetary
policy was not as easy as originally attested. Mehra and Minton (2007) also make use of
real-time data, finding that a model which targets the core consumer price index (CPI) in-
flation forecasts fits actual policy movements well. Combined, these studies lay to rest the
notion that policy was too easy. But the use of core CPI by Mehra and Minton (2007) for
the entire sample is where the second caveat lies. What this literature fails to consider is the
fact that the inputs to the Federal Reserve’s hypothetical monetary policy rule have changed
over time.1 For example, the measure of inflation used by monetary policy makers alone has
been refined multiple times since the mid-1980s. Prior to July 1988, inflation forecasts were
presented using the implicit GNP deflator.2 Humphrey-Hawkins reports then suggest that
inflation forecasts were estimated using changes in the headline CPI.3 Beginning in February,
2000, the Fed began presenting its forecasts via changes in the headline personal consump-
tion expenditures (PCE) chain-type price index, eventually refining it down to core PCE
1Orphanides and Wieland (2008) does correct for this by directly including the forecasts from the
Humphrey-Hawkins reports, smoothing any changes in the inflation measurement used from one period
to another.
2Taylor (1993) uses lagged inflation measured in this manner in his original monetary policy rule.
3The Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act set forth clearer goals for both fiscal and monetary policy.
A requirement of this legislation was that the Board of Governors must send a report (called a Humphrey-
Hawkins report) to congress semiannually outlining monetary policy. These reports include both past and
forecasted data as motivation for its stance.
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in mid-2004. Figure (3.2) presents the differences between these measurements, which can
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Figure 3.2: Inflation Measures Considered by the Federal Reserve
Note: The data presented here are expressed in quarterly terms during the period 1995Q1–
2014Q4. The measurement for Core PCE is the revised percent change in the personal
consumption expenditures chain-type price index less food and energy from the previous
year. The dotted line is for reference purposes only and represents the threshold between
inflation and deflation.
be considerable at times. The divergence in the headline measures of inflation are generally
seen in the level, though headline PCE is also slightly less volatile. Conversely, the dissimi-
larity between the headline and core measures of inflation are generally seen in the volatility.
Using Greenbook forecasts of different inflation measures, Mehra and Sawhney (2010) find
that monetary policy did as a standard Taylor rule would suggest, meaning that policy be-
tween 2001–2007 did not qualify as “too easy". Additionally, Dokko et al. (2009) consider
both real-time data and the correct measures of inflation, finding that these persistently low
interest rates were not a primary contributing factor to the formation of the housing bubble
and that any aid from it was small. Thus, while many chastised the Fed for its easy-money
stance, use of the correct data suggests that it was acting responsibly.
Looking at the history of Fed considerations, a tangental literature raises the next impor-
tant question: What is the best measure of inflation for monetary policy to target? Typical
analysis of this question only addresses the difference between the use of headline CPI ver-
sus core CPI, which removes effects from changes in food and energy costs (i.e. Mehra and
Minton, 2007).4 Mishkin (2008, pg. 7-8) outlines the reasons for targeting core inflation over
4There are many versions of core inflation, differing in everything from what goods/services are omitted
to how they are omitted.
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headline inflation, saying in reference to the New Neoclassical Synthesis:
Indeed, these models indicate that monetary policy should try to get the economy
to operate at the same level that would prevail if all prices were flexible–that is,
at the so-called natural rate of output or employment. Stabilizing sticky prices
helps the economy get close to the theoretical flexible-price equilibrium because it
keeps sticky prices from moving away from their appropriate relative level while
flexible prices are adjusting to their own appropriate relative level.
Thus, he claims that the proper measurement for use by monetary policy makers are core
inflation statistics. Equivalently, central banks need to realize the difference between tran-
sitory, exogenous adjustments to the inflation rate and focus on the underlying trend in
inflation. Considering a more general framework, Anand and Prasad (2010) show that this
may not hold in all situations. They claim that welfare-maximizing monetary policy targets
headline CPI when the economy faces incomplete markets characterized by credit-constrained
consumers and financial frictions.5
While the literature does consider whether to target headline or core measures of infla-
tion, a few have also debated whether inflation measured by the CPI or the PCE price index
is better. From the basic formula to the scope of the basket of goods, Clark (1999) diligently
discusses the differences between the two headline measures, suggesting that inflation should
be measured by the CPI. On the other hand, Rich and Steindel (2007) compare the core
versions of each, finding that neither measure consistently dominates the other. One major
difference between the two measures is that the PCE is continually updated as new informa-
tion surfaces. Croushore (2008) finds that these revisions are actually forecastable, adding
another wrinkle to the use of the broader measure. Essentially, this implies that the use of
real-time PCE data should be adjusted for the forecasted revisions before being implemented
5Additionally, they find that strict inflation targeting is no longer optimal, finding that welfare-maximizing
monetary policy must also react to the output gap. They do find, however, if the only friction in the economy
is price-stickiness, strict targeting of core inflation is optimal, which falls directly in line with the Mishkin
(2008) analysis.
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in monetary policy. Granted, most of the literature finds the Federal Reserve to be forward
looking (see Mehra and Minton, 2007; Orphanides and Wieland, 2008, among others), but
it is hard to believe that the members of the FOMC do not consider current data at least in
relation to past forecasts. So not only is the measurement different, but their applications
can also deviate.
While there are many aspects of this literature and all are very thorough in their analyses,
nearly all of them lack a fiscal policy authority of any kind. The seminal work of Sargent
and Wallace (1981) suggests that there are instances where monetary policy could leave the
Taylor principle unsatisfied and yet the economy could still have a stable, unique equilibrium.
Showing that, if fiscal policy set taxes as it saw fit, monetary policy makers could undertake a
backseat role in simply controlling the level of real outstanding debt. Leeper (1991) further
defines the concepts of active and passive monetary and fiscal policy, showing that the
dynamics of the model are not always simply a function of the central bank’s decisions.
Furthermore, the works of Davig and Leeper (2011) and Bianchi (2012) suggest that the
active and passive stances of policy makers often change. Thus, it is important for analysis
of these types of monetary policy changes to not abstract away from fiscal policy decisions.
How the economy is impacted may not always just depend on the stance of one policy maker.
This paper follows the debate between using broad or narrow inflation measures in mon-
etary policy, but also considers the fact that fiscal policy, such as tax codes and transfer
systems, has remained indexed to the narrow measure. I consider a two-sector New Keyne-
sian model with sector-specific price stickiness similar in structure to the works of Anand
and Prasad (2010), Du and Yagihashi (2015), and Iacoviello (2005). These sectors represent
basic consumption goods as well as healthcare services, with each composed of intermediate
and final producers. The inclusion of healthcare services provides a sector of the economy
that is not generally considered under CPI, which is my narrow measure of inflation, but is
considered under PCE, the broad measure.6 Another motivation for the use of this sector is
6The scope of CPI focuses on out-of-pocket expenditures by households in urban settings, while PCE
expands the scope to include expenses such as healthcare, which is typically provided for by employers and
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that healthcare services as a share of personal consumption expenditures in the United States
has gradually risen since 1960, yet has been one of the more stable sectors of consumption,
as shown in Figures (3.3) and (3.4). As can be seen, the growth of healthcare services in
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Figure 3.3: Healthcare Services as a Share of Personal Consumption Expenditures
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Figure 3.4: Growth Rates of Healthcare Services and Personal Consumption Expenditures
Note: These growth rates are measured as annualized month-to-month growth rates from
January 1995, to January 2015. Health services are represented by the thicker, black line
(which is more stable) while overall personal consumption expenditures are represented by
the thinner, blue line. This subsample was chosen due to difficult interpretation caused by
the high frequency of the data and the need to show current trends.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
the United States economy has been much more stable than overall personal consumption
expenditures. This implies that those sectors included in the measurement of CPI must be
even more volatile than the overall PCE shown here. Additionally, it is easy to recognize
not directly out of the household’s pocket.
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that the healthcare sector is growing in importance, as the average household spending has
shifted toward this sector more and more over the past decades. Statistically, past studies
have found that the prices in the healthcare sector are stickier than those in the general
goods markets. For example, Bils and Klenow (2004) find empirical evidence that consumer
goods prices adjust about every 7 months, while prices in the healthcare sector clear about
every 9.75 months. Because of this, the inclusion of the healthcare sector alone should make
the inflation target less volatile, as shown in Figure (3.2). In an sense, PCE-derived inflation
is like a more diversified portfolio, yielding slightly lower returns (inflation rates), yet is more
stable than a CPI-derived portfolio. Using these sectors allows me to analyze the impacts
of the economy when the economy as a whole (especially fiscal policy) focuses on a narrow
measure of inflation and monetary policy moves to a broader inflation measure. My findings
suggest that switching from a narrow to a broad regime does not impact the model’s deter-
minacy properties (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) much. However, just because the model may
remain stable does not necessarily mean that the dynamics are unaltered overall. Running
simulations of the model shows that the choice of monetary policy regime can have a dramatic
impact on the means and standard deviations of the variables. These simulations are also
dependent on the coordination efforts between the monetary and fiscal authorities (Leeper,
1991). Under the standard active monetary/passive fiscal regime, switching inflation mea-
sures can actually put downward pressure on real fiscal debt levels. Conversely, estimation
of the policy rules suggests that the model is in a passive monetary/active fiscal regime. In
this case switching inflation measures puts substantial upward pressure on real fiscal debt
levels.7 Interestingly, the switch in inflation measures not only puts extensive upward pres-
sure on fiscal debt, but it also decreases the standard deviation, suggesting that debt is
higher yet more stable under these policies. In a general sense, though, this switch causes
standard deviations for many key variables to rise, a testament to policy makers reacting to
the economy as a whole and being less concerned with sector-specific adjustments.
7The estimation of a passive/active regime is common in the literature during this period of time. See
Davig and Leeper (2011) as one of multiple examples.
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The rest of the paper is presented as follows: Section 3.2 provides empirical motivation
in the form of a time-varying parameter model; Section 3.3 presents the New Keynesian
model; Section 3.4 then presents the results of that model, including analysis under different
monetary and fiscal policy regimes; Section 3.5 concludes and offers additional thoughts on
this topic.
3.2 Motivation: A TVP-FAVAR Model
Empirically analyzing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has always been a
difficult task. The use of vector autoregressions (VAR) has typically been the emphasis,
but there are many drawbacks to these models. The most common is simply the lack of
observations. In order to completely understand the transmission of monetary policy, many
variables need to be included, but the lack of observations makes this impossible. Bernanke
et al. (2005) make use of principle component analysis to overcome this, estimating what
they call a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model. Doing so allows them
to consider many variables while still maintaining parsimony for better estimates. Another
issue with the standard VAR approach is that, as mentioned above, there have been many
changes to monetary policy over the years. This has prompted many to use time-varying
parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) models such as that considered by Primiceri
(2005), for example. The logical next step is to attempt to overcome both of these pitfalls
simultaneously. Thus, using the methods derived by Del Negro and Otrok (2008), Korobilis
(2009) presents a time-varying parameter, factor-augmented vector autoregression (TVP-
FAVAR) model in which the information from a large dataset is integrated into a TVP-VAR
model.
While the goal of Korobilis (2009) is to consider monetary policy since 1960, this paper
considers the changes that have occurred since about the year 2000. Therefore, I utilize his
benchmark model and dataset, constructing a TVP-FAVAR with four factors and two lags.
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This framework can conveniently be structured in a state-space format, where
xt
yt
 = λt
ft
yt
+ εgt
ft
yt
 = Bt
ft−1
yt−1
+ εyt
are the observation and state equations, respectively. Here, xt is an (n1×1) vector of variables
that represent the economy. The variables come from all sectors of the economy and include
various measurements of output, payrolls, interest rates, investment, price indices, etc. In
a similar fashion, yt is an (n2 × 1) vector of monetary policy variables, in this case the
chosen measurements of inflation, unemployment, and the federal funds rate. The factors
are denoted by ft, which is a (k × 1) vector with k < n1. The matrices λt and Bt represent
the time-varying factor loadings and state equation coefficients, respectively. This model
is then estimated using Bayesian techniques, which provides the time-varying parameters
necessary for this analysis. For a more thorough, technical explanation of the estimation
process, see Korobilis (2009), Del Negro and Otrok (2008), and Koop (2003).
This setup is identical to the benchmark model of Korobilis (2009), down to the variables
included in xt. The single adjustment I make to this model is to the vector of monetary
policy instruments yt. Here, I follow with the literature of Mehra and Minton (2007) and
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) by substituting out the original inflation data. I replace the
GDP Deflator data (which is used for the entire sample period), with the actual inflation
measures used in the monetary policy consideration, such as headline CPI, headline PCE,
and core PCE.
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3.2.1 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism
The first important question that needs to be addressed is “how does a change in the inflation
target impact the effectiveness of monetary policy?” Figure (3.5) presents some basic impulse
responses derived from the TVP-FAVAR model described above. These impulse responses
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses for a Unit Shock to Interest Rates
are unit shocks to the interest rate equation and the subsequent reactions of inflation and
the unemployment rate. I plot both the 1996Q1 and the 2006Q3 responses to show that
the effect of altering interest rates is similar in both situations, even though policy makers
are targeting a different inflation measure in each period. With the 80% credible intervals
plotted as well, it’s easy to see that these responses are not statistically different. Even the
existence of a price puzzle does not change. This is rather intuitive since the two competing
measures of inflation are similar in so many ways. Therefore, the effectiveness of monetary
policy does not seem to be radically changed when moving from one measure of inflation to
73
another.
3.2.2 The General Rise in Standard Deviations
While the differences may not be seen in the impulse responses, they can be seen when
looking at how the standard deviations of the variables change over time. Figure (3.6) plots
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Figure 3.6: Posterior Means of the Standard Deviations
the time-varying posterior means of the standard deviations of the variables in the state
equation. The first panel looks at the four factors that are derived from the original 115
economics indicators. These factors represent the data in general, and it can be seen that
their standard deviations begin to drift upwards starting around 2000, just as the Federal
Reserve switched from a headline CPI target to a headline PCE target. What is interesting
to note is that the standard deviation from the interest rate equation begins to fall in mid-
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2001, just as those of the factors begin to rise. This is fairly intuitive if one notices in
Figure 3.2 that the variations of the inflation targets fall as we move from headline CPI to
headline PCE to core PCE. Thus, if the measurement used by monetary policy makers is less
volatile, so too will be the interest rate they use as an instrument. However, this means that
the additional components in the headline measurements are allowed to adjust more freely,
causing increases in standard deviations across the factors. Additionally, moving from a
narrower measure (CPI) to a broader measure (PCE) makes the inflation target less volatile,
since any sector-specific fluctuations are averaged-out by the other sectors. Combining these
results suggests that the efficiency of monetary policy may not be altered in a significant
manner, but that the variability of the economic indicators could increase by targeting a
broader inflation measure.
3.3 Two-Sector New Keynesian Model
As was mentioned above, I consider a two-sector New Keynesian model with a representative
household and both monetary and fiscal authorities. The sectors include standard consump-
tion goods as well as healthcare services as in Du and Yagihashi (2015). The relationship
between these sectors is much like Anand and Prasad (2010), but in this case there different
levels of sticky prices in each sector.8 The fiscal authority indexes its tax code and transfer
system to the narrow measure, and all real variables are considered as adjusted by the nar-
row price index. The monetary authority, however has the option of targeting the standard,
narrow measure of inflation or the broader measure of inflation, which also gives weight to
price adjustments in the healthcare sector.
8Anand and Prasad (2010) considers the choice between monetary policy makers targeting headline or
core inflation, which necessitates one sector with sticky prices and one without.
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3.3.1 Representative Household
The representative household obtains utility from real consumer goods ct as well as its health
status xt. Consumer goods are valued relative to an internal habit formation system with
persistence δ, while the health status is derived from their flow of real healthcare services ht
and normalized leisure (1− lt) such that
xt = h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ,
where lt denotes labor hours and κh > 0 and κl > 0 denote the weights on health services
and leisure, respectively. This functional form assumes that not only will doctor’s visits and
medicine make the household healthier, but rest and leisure also contribute to health status.
Combining these, the one-period utility function for the household is given as
Ut = εβt
[
1
1− σc
(ct − δct−1)1−σc +
1
1− σx
x1−σxt
]
,
where σc > 1 and σx > 1 are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution for
regular goods consumption and health status, respectively. The term εβt is a shock to the
discount factor following an autoregressive law of motion in its logarithm
εβt = (1− ρβ)εβ + ρβε
β
t−1 + η
β
t
with persistence ρβ ∈ [0, 1) and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation ηβt is nor-
mally distributed with standard deviation νβ. Utility in this functional form follows that of
Hall and Jones (2007) and Du and Yagihashi (2015), in which instantaneous utility adjusts
monotonically with consumption goods and health status.
In each period, the representative household purchases consumption goods at price P ct
and health services at price P ht . It also interacts in the financial markets through the purchase
of nominal discount bonds Bt at price 1/rt, where rt is the gross nominal interest rate. To
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purchase these, the household earns income by supplying labor lt at nominal wage rate Wt,
acquiring dividend payments Dt from the intermediate goods-producing firms in each sector,
and transfer payments from the fiscal authority. Additionally, there is a tax system which
includes taxes on labor. Mathematically, this budget constraint can be expressed as
P ct ct + P
h
t ht +
Bt
rt
+ τ ∗t = Wtlt +Dt +Bt−1 + Tt, (3.1)
where Tt are the nominal transfer payments which are exogenous to the household and τ ∗t
are the total tax liabilities of the household.
The taxes are levied by the fiscal authority, making the total tax liabilities of the house-
hold
τ ∗t = τtWtlt; (3.2)
where the distortionary tax rate, τt, represents the labor income tax. This is possibly time
varying and set by the fiscal authority.
Maximizing utility subject to its budget constraints, the representative household’s op-
timality conditions are shown below. The solution method can be found in the appendix.
εβt (ct − δct−1)−σc − δβEt
[
εβt+1(ct+1 − δct)−σc
]
= Λ1t
εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κhxt
ht
=
P ht
P ct
Λ1t
εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κlxt
1− lt
=
Wt
P ct
(1− τwt )Λ1t
βEt
[
Λ1t+1
Pt+1
]
=
Λ1t
P ct rt
Where Λ1t is the marginal utility of consumption. These equations, in addition to the budget
constraint combining (3.1) and (3.2), provide all of the equilibrium conditions necessary for
the household sector of the model.
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3.3.2 Sectoral Good-Producing Firms
With the inclusion of the healthcare sector, this model will have two sectoral good-producing
firms denoted by n ∈ {c, h}, where c represents the consumption good market and h repre-
sents the healthcare market. Since the focus of this paper is the change in inflation dynamics
under a broad policy target, I abstract from the structural differences between the two sectors
and allow the stickiness of their price to be the only noteworthy difference. This allows for a
simpler analysis, showing that the trends seen in the data can be captured by dissimilarities
in the sectors’ price dynamics only.
For each perfectly competitive market, the firm purchases differentiated goods ynt (j)
from the continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms in its sector indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]
at price P nt (j). They then aggregate these goods using a standard constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
ynt =
(∫ 1
0
ynt (j)
ε
s,n
t −1
ε
s,n
t dj
) εs,nt
ε
s,n
t −1
Here, εs,nt represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in market n
following an AR(1) process
εs,nt = (1− ρs,n)εs,n + ρs,nε
s,n
t−1 + η
s,n
t
where ρs,n ∈ [0, 1) and ηs,nt is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation which is normally
distributed with standard deviation νs,n. Considering the profit function
P nt y
n
t −
∫ 1
0
P nt (j)y
n
t (j)dj,
optimality for the sectoral good-producing firms is reached when the demand for each inter-
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mediate good j is given by
ynt (j) =
(
P nt (j)
P nt
)−εs,nt
ynt . (3.3)
Given the demand for each intermediate good above and the perfectly competitive nature of
each market, the aggregate price level for each sector n is given by
P nt =
(∫ 1
0
P nt (j)
1−εs,nt dj
) 1
1−εs,nt
3.3.3 Intermediate Goods-Producing Firms
As was mentioned above, there is a continuum of monopolistically-competitive, intermediate
goods-producing firms labeled by j ∈ [0, 1] in each sector n ∈ {c, h}. Each firm combines
labor and capital to produce its intermediate good
ynt (j) = ε
p
t l
n
t (j)
where εpt is total factor productivity, which follows an autoregressive process with persis-
tence ρp ∈ [0, 1] and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation ηpt , which is normally
distributed with standard deviation νp.
εpt = (1− ρp)εp + ρpε
p
t−1 + η
p
t
With a monopolistically competitive market comes discrepancies in the goods and a
deviation from the price-taker scenario. I assume, as in Rotemberg (1982), that there is a
quadratic cost of price adjustment in each market, which is measured in terms of the sectoral
good.
Φnt (j) =
φnp
2
(
P nt (j)
πnP nt−1(j)
− 1
)2
ynt ∀j ∈ [0, 1] (3.4)
The parameter φnp governs the magnitude of the cost in market n, while πn is the steady
state inflation rate in the same market. This price setting friction makes the firms’ problems
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dynamic. Thus, they choose a new price P nt (j) which maximizes the present value of expected
future profits. The stochastic discounting factor is determined by the household’s marginal
utility since they reap the benefits of the profits as owners. Their problems then become
max
Pnt (j)
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiυiΛ1t+i
Dnt+i(j)
P nt+i
∀j ∈ [0, 1].
The firms’ nominal profits are
Dnt (j) = P
n
t (j)y
n
t (j)−Wtlnt (j)− P nt Φnt (j) ∀j ∈ [0, 1].
Converting this into real profit and considering the sectoral goods-producing firms’ demand
(3.3) and the price adjustment cost (3.4), the expanded real profits for each sector are
Dnt (j)
Pnt
=
(
Pnt (j)
Pnt
)1−εs,nt
ynt −
(
Pnt (j)
Pnt
)−εs,nt Wtynt
Pnt ε
p
t
−
φnp
2
(
Pnt (j)
πnPnt−1(j)
− 1
)2
ynt ∀j ∈ [0, 1].
Maximizing these real profits subject to the demand of the final good firm yields the in-
termediate firms’ optimality condition, which represents the New Keynesian Philips Curve
when linearized.
(1− εs,nt )
(
Pnt (j)
Pnt
)−εs,nt Λ1t ynt
Pnt
+ εs,nt
(
Pnt (j)
Pnt
)−εs,nt −1 WtΛ1t ynt
(Pnt )
2εpt
−φnp
(
Pnt (j)
πnPnt−1(j)
− 1
)
Λ1t y
n
t
πnPnt−1(j)
+ βφnpEt
[(
Pnt+1(j)
πnPnt (j)
− 1
)
Pnt+1(j)Λ
1
t+1y
n
t+1
πnPnt (j)
2
]
= 0
for all j ∈ [0, 1] and each n ∈ {c, h}. The derivation of this condition can be found in the
appendix.
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3.3.4 Fiscal Policy
In this model, I consider real government spending gt to be exogenous. In addition to this,
the fiscal authority also pays off its outstanding debt and issues transfer payments to the
households. To pay for these expenses, they levy labor and capital return taxes as well as
issue nominal discount bounds. With all of this in mind, the government’s budget constraint
becomes
Ptgt + Tt +Bt−1 =
Bt
rt
+ τtWtlt.
The tax policy and transfer payments are assumed to be set in the legislation ahead of
time, making them rule-based. The tax rate, like the Federal income tax system, is dependent
on the household’s wages.
τt = (1− ρτ )τ̄ + ρτ
[
τt−1 + γτ
(
wtlt
wt−1lt−1
(πct )
1−χτ − 1
)]
(3.5)
Here, ρτ ∈ [0, 1] determines the stationarity and γτ determines the progressiveness of the
tax codes, while χτ > 0 determines the level of indexation to inflation. Note that there is
no restriction on γτ , allowing me to analyze the policy as a progressive (γτ > 0), regressive
(γτ < 0), and flat (γτ = 0) tax code. Indexation also plays an important role here. If we
consider the τ̄ to be the intended steady state tax rate set by the fiscal authority, the true
steady state tax rate
τ = τ̄ +
ρτγτ
1− ρτ
[
(πc)1−χ
τ − 1
]
,
actually deviates from the intended tax rate. Both fiscal and monetary policy makers can
contribute to the solution of this problem. On the fiscal side, policy makers can completely
index the tax code to inflation (χτ = 1) or they can simply enact a flat tax (γτ = 0). Both
policies will allow them to hit their targeted tax rate. On the monetary policy side, policy
makers can target zero inflation (πc = 1). Without at least one of these policies, fiscal policy
makers will not be able to hit their intended tax rates. This is a classic case of bracket creep
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in the long run, suggesting that the households will automatically be paying, and expecting,
higher tax rates than those set forth in legislation. A rudimentary analysis of the labor
wedge response to changes in the level of indexation can be found in the appendix.
On the other side of this coin are the lump-sum real transfers from the fiscal authority
to the household, tt = Tt/Pt. These transfers, like the tax code above, is assumed to be set in
legislation and remain, following the rule
tt = (1− ρT )t̄+ ρT
[
tt−1 + γT
(
yct−1
yct
(πct )
χT−1 − 1
)]
.
This rule is constructed in the same manner as (3.5), but is assumed to be dependent on
the overall health of the real economy. The parameter ρT ∈ [0, 1] governs the persistence of
the transfer system, while γT controls the sensitivity of the transfers to changes in the real
aggregate economy. And also like the tax code, γT has no restrictions. When γT > 0, this
policy is considered to be countercyclical, while a negative value constitutes a pro-cyclical
policy. Setting this at zero will make the transfers constant. Analyzing the steady state
value of these transfers and assuming that t̄t is the intended level of real transfers to the
household,
t = t̄+
ρTγT
1− ρT
[
(πc)χ
T−1 − 1
]
,
implies that the steady state level of real transfers will fall below the intended level, assuming
χT > 0 like its counterparts in the tax code. Again, a flat transfer system (γT = 0) or a
completely indexed system (χT = 1) can alleviate this problem from the fiscal side. Having
a zero steady state inflation rate (πc = 1) will fix this from the monetary side.
When considering both the tax code and the transfer system, it is easy to see that, if
neither the fiscal nor the monetary side step up to control this problem, there will be upward
pressure on government revenues while downward pressure on government expenditures,
providing some relief for the fiscal debt burden.9
9While the automatic indexation of the federal income tax code was signed into law in 1981, the policy
was legislated to take effect in 1985 in hopes that bracket creep during that time would at least partially
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3.3.5 Monetary Authority: Measurement and Policy
The next goal is to derive the overall price index Pt. To do so in a tractable manner, I
assume that the monetary authority measures aggregate output yt using the following CES
production function:
yt =
(yct )
ω (yht )1−ω
ωω(1− ω)1−ω
(3.6)
This functional form is similar to those used by Aoki (2001) and Erceg and Levin (2006) in
which the contribution of regular consumption goods and health care services is constant.
A driving force behind the function form used in (3.6) is that it implies a simple aggregate
price level
Pt = (P
c
t )
ω (P ht )
1−ω. (3.7)
This is particularly helpful since the conversion from an aggregate price level to an aggregate
inflation rate is also simple. Simply dividing both sides of (3.7) by Pt−1 yields
πt = (π
c
t )
ω(πht )
1−ω
This implies a similar functional form to that used in the personal consumption expenditures
statistic and the implied chain-type price index. This type of index is broader in scope than
the tradition consumer price index in that it includes more of the healthcare sector, such as
payments made by employers on behalf of their employees.
In terms of monetary policy, I close the model with a simple Taylor (1993)-type rule
offset the revenue losses from the major reductions in the tax rates. It was thought that the expansionary
effects of tax reductions could take multiple years to fully take effect.
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which considers rate smoothing as well as both inflation and a measure of output growth.10
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)
[
r + ρπ (Et(πt+1)− π) + ρy
(
yt
yt−1
− 1
)]
+ ηrt (3.8)
Here, ηrt is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated shock which is distributed normally with stan-
dard deviation νr. Additionally, my analysis will consider alterations in the monetary au-
thority’s inputs, be it the aggregate inflation and output measures, or the consumer goods
market measures only. In a sense, this represents the Federal Reserve’s choice between using
a CPI-based measure, which is narrower in scope, and a PCE Chained Index-based measure,
which is broader in scope. The fiscal policy maker indexes (perhaps incompletely) its tax
code and transfer payments systems to the narrower measure. Additionally, the value of real
variables are measured using the narrower index, reflecting the general public’s preference
for CPI when adjusting for inflation.
3.3.6 Equilibrium Conditions and Stationarity
A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations for which households and firms
behave optimally and all markets clear, given values of the exogenous processes and initial
values of the endogenous states. That is, households maximize utility subject to it budget
constraints and the intermediate goods-producing firms in each market maximize their profits
subject to their technology constraints and the demand by each market’s sectoral good-
producing firm. Since the firms in each sector produce with the same technology, I assume
that they all make the same decisions, allowing me to drop the j indicator. Additionally,
the aggregating functions of the monetary authority must hold along with the interest rate
and tax/transfer rules.
10The empirical conclusions of Rudebusch (2002, 2006) suggest that monetary policy estimates with high
degrees of smoothing may be misspecified. He argues that smoothing is a very short-term (weekly or monthly)
phenomenon and that estimates suggesting smoothing at the quarterly or yearly level may be the result of
serial correlation of the error terms. While this can be a very important problem in the empirical literature,
I consider the inclusion of higher levels of smoothing and the omission of serial correlation in the shock terms
to be sufficient for a model such as this one.
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In addition to these equations holding, I must also define some equilibrium equations
based on the assumptions of the model. First, goods produced in the consumption sector
can only be consumed by the household and by government as regular consumption goods.
Similarly, goods produced in the health services sector can only be consumed by the house-
hold and by the government as health goods. Thus, the following conditions must hold in
steady state.
yct = ct + g
c
t
yht = ht + g
h
t
where
gt = g
c
t + p
h
t g
h
t .
Since I assume a symmetric equilibrium, the following conditions hold in the labor market:
lt = l
c
t + l
h
t ,
lct =
∫ 1
0
lct (j)dj,
and
lht =
∫ 1
0
lht (j)dj.
With these, we have ynt = ε
p
t l
n
t for both sectors n ∈ {c, h}.
Since the price level P nt = πnt P nt−1 for both sectors of the economy, the nominal variables
inherit a unit root. To ensure their stationarity, we simply adjust the nominal variables for
the price level. Universal measures like the market wage rate Wt, the dividend income Dt,
and nominal bonds Bt are indexed to the consumption goods price level since consumption
goods make up the general, day-to-day, majority of expenditures relative to health services.
Thus, wt = Wt/P ct , dt = Dt/P ct , and bt = Bt/P ct must hold. There is one additional caveat to the
dividend payments. The dividends are profits from each of the production sectors, which
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consider different price indexes when maximizing profits. Therefore, real dividend payments
from each of the sectors are defined as dct = D
c
t/P ct and dht = D
h
t/Pht . With this in mind,
aggregated real dividend payments must be
dt = d
c
t + p
h
t d
h
t ,
where pht = P
h
t /P ct is the relative price level, or the real price of health services, which is also
stationary. Considering this gives me
pht =
πht
πct
pht−1
which suggests that the steady state path of prices in each sector must grow at the same
rate. Combining all of this gives my model 27 equations to solve for 27 stationary variables.
These variables include xt, ht, ct, lt, pht , bt, rt, τt, wt, dct , dht , πct , tt, ε
β
t , Λt, yt, yct , yht , πt, πht ,
lct , lht , ε
p
t , ε
s,c
t , ε
s,h
t , gc, and gh.
3.4 Results
In this section I first calibrate and solve for the steady state values of the model. I then
consider the determinacy properties (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) when looking at varying
monetary and fiscal policy stances. Considering arbitrarily assigned monetary and fiscal pol-
icy parameters initially, I analyze the model’s properties under what I consider the “standard”
policy stances on both sides. I then extend the analysis by estimating the policy parameters
and applying them to the model, suggesting that the stances of monetary and fiscal policy
makers are important when considering switching from a policy rule that considers a narrow
measure of inflation to one which considers a broader measure.
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3.4.1 Calibration
This model includes 39 parameters, most of which I will calibrate to match empirical trends.
Since this model is smaller than that of Smets and Wouters (2003), using estimation tech-
niques for the parameter values does not yield the same level of intuitiveness. Since tax
and transfer policies are adjusted annually, I calibrate to match annual trends. The av-
erage effective federal funds rate, which closely matches the rates of one-year bonds, was
4.38 percent between 1990 and 2007. Thus, I fix r = 1.04. The steady state version of the
model implies that the target inflation rates in both sectors and in the aggregate must be
equal to ensure stability. Because of this, I calibrate steady state inflation measures to be
π = πc = πh = 1.02, reflecting the implied two percent inflation target. This, in turn, fixes
the subjective discount factor β = πc/r, which is approximately 0.98. In addition to these, I
also fix δ = 0.7, which matches the estimates of Sims and Wolff (2013). I use this estimate
because they also consider a household with internal habit formation, instead of external
habit formation as in the Smets and Wouters (2003) model.
Switching to the health status of the household and its preferences, in general, I calibrate
σc = 2.0 to match that in Hall and Jones (2007). Additionally, I assume that the elasticity
of substitution regarding health status σx is identical. Considering that health and utility
are quite similar intrinsically, a calibrate κh = 1 and fix κl = 3.409 to peg total labor hours
l = 1/3. This implies a standard eight hour work day, given total hours normalized to unity.
It is generally assumed that the average markup in the consumer goods sector is about
20%, whereas Dranove et al. (1993) suggest that the price markup in the healthcare sector
is about 30% in this context. With this in mind, I calibrate the elasticities of substitution
to be εs,c = 6 and εs,h = 4.3. The first order conditions of the intermediate goods-producing
firms in each sector, when linearized around the steady state, yield New Keynesian Philips
Curves. Within these curves lies the speed at which each market’s prices completely adjust.
King and Watson (1996) suggest that the deviations in the price level in the goods market
from its desired value clear at about a ten percent pace per quarter. This translates into
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Parameter Value
Intertemporal Discount Factor (β) 0.98
Habit Persistence (δ) 0.70
Discount Factor Shock (εβ) 1.00
Elasticity: Consumer Goods Firms (εs,c) 6.00
Elasticity: Healthcare Firms (εs,h) 4.30
Total Factor Productivity (εp) 3.00
Output Share of Consumer Goods (ω) 0.78
Indexation: Tax Code (χτ ) 1.00
Indexation: Transfer System (χT ) 1.00
Price Adjustment Cost: Consumer Goods Sector (φcp) 15.65
Price Adjustment Cost: Healthcare Sector (φhp) 16.98
Health Status Share: Health Services (κh) 1.00
Health Status Share: Leisure Hours (κl) 3.00
Elasticity: Consumer Goods (σc) 2.00
Elasticity: Health Status (σx) 2.00
Monetary Policy: Long Run Rate (r) 1.04
Monetary Policy: Inflation Target (π) 1.02
Desired Tax Rate (τ̄) 0.24
Desired Transfer Payments (t̄) 0.00
Consumer Goods: Government (gc) 0.20
Health Services: Government (gh) 0.00
Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
about a 46% annual pace in the goods markets. As was mentioned ealier, Bils and Klenow
(2004) find empirical evidence that consumer goods prices adjust about every 7 months,
while prices in the healthcare sector clear about every 9.75 months. Using these relative
rates, I need to calibrate the model such that consumption goods prices adjust at about
a 46% pace and healthcare prices adjust at about a 33% pace. Combining these finding
and assumptions, I calibrate φcp = 15.65 and φhp = 16.98. On the policy side of the model,
I assume that the healthcare component of the monetary authority’s aggregate inflation
measure is approximately 22%, implying ω = 0.78 and matching the findings of Blair (2014).
As for the spending aspect of the model, I assume in the base model that gc = 0.20 and
gh = 0.0, implying that government spending is done purely in the consumer goods markets
and is about 20% of output, matching the annual trend.
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3.4.2 Steady State
Given the parameter values outlined above, I calculate the steady state values of each of the
real variables. For this baseline analysis, I assume that χτ = χT = 1, in which case both the
tax code and the transfer system are perfectly indexed to inflation, since this has been the
goal since 1985.11 The values of these variables in steady state can be found in Table 3.2.
Again, an exploration of the impact of various levels of indexation on the labor wedge and
these steady state values can be found in the appendix.
3.4.3 Determinacy Regions
Here I present the parameter spaces which yield particular dynamic properties in the model
as outlined by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). In this section I will first discuss the tradeoffs
that must be considered by monetary and fiscal policy makers. Next, given fiscal policy, I
explore what monetary policy can do to maintain a stable economy.
3.4.3.1 Active and Passive Policy Combinations
To get a better sense of what the dynamic properties of the model look like under different
policy regimes, I evaluate the determinacy regions of my model below. First, I consider both
monetary and fiscal policy. To keep the equations simple, I continue to assume that the tax
code and the transfer system are perfectly indexed to inflation (χτ = χT = 1).12 Additionally,
I assume strict inflation targeting, omitting the output growth rate from monetary policy
consideration (ρy = 0), and a random walk tax code which depends on the growth rate of
income (ρτ = 1). This specification of the tax code, I believe, is the most akin to an actual
income tax code. Figure (3.7) presents the parameter space in this situation. The x-axis
depicts the stance of monetary policy ρπ while the y-axis represents the stance of fiscal policy
11Automatically indexing the federal income tax code began in 1985, but this policy was signed into law
under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which also cut top marginal rates from 70% to 50%.
12The absence of this assumption requires a new steady state to be calculated for each parameterization
of the monetary and fiscal policy rules. Future versions or extensions of this paper will most likely include
adjustments to these parameters.
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Variable Steady State
Consumable Goods: Household (ct) 0.411
Health Services: Household (ht) 0.389
Total Labor Supply (lt) 0.333
Consumption Labor Supply (lct ) 0.204
Healthcare Labor Supply (lht ) 0.130
Health Status (xt) 0.115
Aggregate Output (yt) 0.937
Consumer Goods Output (yct ) 0.611
Healthcare Goods Output (ytt) 0.389
Inflation: Aggregate (πt) 1.020
Inflation: Consumer Goods (πct ) 1.020
Inflation: Healthcare Goods (πht ) 1.020
Gross Nominal Interest Rate (rt) 1.040
Real Price of Health Services (pht ) 1.086
Real Wage Rate (wt) 2.500
Profit: Consumer Goods Sector (dct) 0.102
Profit: Healthcare Goods Sector (dht ) 0.090
Tax Rate (τt) 0.240
Transfers (tt) 0.000
Consumer Goods: Government (gct ) 0.200
Health Services: Government (ght ) 0.000
Fiscal Revenues (τtwtlt) 0.200
Fiscal Debt (bt) 0.000
Marginal Utility of Consumption (Λt) 20.586
Table 3.2: Steady State Values
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Figure 3.7: Monetary and Fiscal Policy
in the form of progressivity γτ . As can be seen, under these simplifying assumptions, there is
a direct parallel to the findings of Leeper (1991) and a clear-cut difference between “active”
and “passive” policy on both sides.13
In the upper-right quadrant of the parameter space I find stability under the standard
determinacy definition with active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy. In this situation
monetary policy makers are controlling the dynamics of the price level, ignoring real fiscal
debt. To ensure stability, fiscal policy makers must make the tax code progressive enough
to control the path of real outstanding fiscal debt.
As I find in the upper-right quadrant, so too do I find determinacy in the lower-left
quadrant of the parameter space. In this instance, however, we have what is considered the
fiscal theory of the price level, in which the roles of the monetary and fiscal policy makers
are reversed. Here fiscal policy is active, meaning that the tax code is not responsive enough
to stabilize real debt levels. Thus, monetary policy must then be passive, adjusting interest
13The parallel mentioned here pertains to the dynamic properties seen in the model when adjusting
monetary and fiscal policy. In the Leeper (1991) sense, fiscal policy is a lump sum tax which responds
directly to the levels of real outstanding government debt. In this model, I construct fiscal policy as an
income tax code, which is dependent on the growth rate of real wages. The results seen here are “parallel” in
the sense that fiscal policy must be progressive enough to control the real level of fiscal debt, meaning that
the tax rate must increase by enough when debt rises. The only clear difference here is in the structure of
the tax rate rule.
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rates in a manner that controls real debt levels, but leaves the pricing function to the control
of fiscal policy.
If both monetary and fiscal policy makers are passive, then the model falls into the
parameter space marred by indeterminacy, or an infinite number of equilibria, shown in the
upper-left quadrant. In this case fiscal policy is passive and controlling the level of real
government debt, but monetary policy makers are not controlling the price level, leaving its
determination to the expectations of the household. In this scenario, the economy can move
from one equilibrium to another without any changes to its fundamentals, yielding what are
commonly called “self-fulfilling prophesies". Under this regime, the economy wanders around
the various equilibria, producing a highly volatile, yet not explosive situation.
If, however, both policy makers are active, the model has no solution. In this scenario,
monetary policy makers are controlling the path of prices, but the tax code is not responsive
enough to control the level of real outstanding debt. Thus, this combination of regimes yields
explosive behavior in all variables since real debt is allowed to explode. This situation is
found in the lower-right quadrant of the parameter space.
3.4.3.2 Monetary Policy Choices
Above I considered both monetary and fiscal policy options and the parameter spaces needed
for determinacy in the model. However, as Romer and Romer (2010) show, there have been
very few alterations to the core of the tax code since 1993. Thus, it is important to consider
the choices of monetary policy makers when fiscal policy remains constant. To begin this
analysis, I fix the progressive aspect of fiscal policy at a calibrated level of γτ = 1.7. This is
the average elasticity of Federal income tax liabilities to changes in income, as measured by
the NBER TAXSIM database from 2000-2013. Additionally, I begin the analysis by assuming
that the tax code is a random walk (ρτ = 1) as before. Figure 3.8 shows the parameter space
in this situation. As can be seen, the response to the growth rate of output does little,
especially when considering the parameter space that yields determinacy. It does, however,
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Figure 3.8: Monetary Policy under ρτ = 1.0
increase the size of the parameter space that renders the model explosive. If I increase the
stationarity parameter in the tax code, I find that the parameter space that yields explosive
behavior (no solution) grows, but the parameter space that results in a unique solution
remains steady.
3.4.3.3 Altering Monetary Policy Regimes
The primary focus of this paper is to consider what happens to the model when switch-
ing monetary policy inputs from a narrower to a broader measure of inflation. From a
determinacy-region point of view, the results are nearly identical as those in Figure 3.7, and
any differences are too small to be worth a discussion. Even under alternative fiscal policy
parameters, these values hold true in both scenarios. While the properties of the parameter
space do not change from one monetary policy regime to the other, this does not mean that
switching regimes does not have an impact overall.
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3.4.4 The Standard Active/Passive Combination
Before getting into the details of estimation and its analysis, I consider an arbitrary parame-
terization in which monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive, placing the model in
the upper-right quadrant of Figure (3.7).14 With this standard policy assumption, I analyze
the impulse responses for short-term analysis as well as the simulated moments of the model
for long-term analysis. In a later section, I use simple non-linear least squares to get an idea
of where these parameters actually fall.
3.4.4.1 Impulse Response Analysis: Monetary Policy
In this section I provide some of the impulse response functions of the model. The first issue
that needs to be addressed is whether there is any alterations to the impact of monetary
policy when moving from a narrow regime to a broad regime. Recall that the empirical
results shown in Figure (3.5) reveal that the impact of monetary policy remains, for the
most part, unaltered. Figures (3.9)–(3.11) show a similar result from the structural model.
The reactions of the variables are fairly standard for monetary policy shocks. An increase
in the monetary policy instrument (interest rate) causes both inflation and output to fall at
the aggregate level. It is interesting to note that the impact on output in the consumption
goods sector (Figure (3.9), top left panel) is much less relative to that in the healthcare
services sector (Figure (3.10), top left panel). The real price of healthcare services doesn’t
change much and oscillates around the steady state, implying that the impact on each sector
is primarily driven by substitutability.
As for how monetary policy translates into the model under each regime, notice that the
impulse responses of the two regimes are nearly identical, laying one on top of the other. So
while the empirical estimates showed no statistical divergence, the structural model shows
almost not difference at all. This is actually a trend among all the model-wide shocks such
14The progressiveness of the tax code is held at γτ = 1.7 as before, while the aggressiveness of monetary
policy towards inflation ρπ = 1.83. This calibration of the monetary policy function is arbitrarily set to the
value found for the Volcker-Greenspan era in Clarida et al. (2000) plus one to ensure it is well above unity.
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Figure 3.9: Consumption-Sector Variables to
Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 3.10: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Monetary Policy Shock
Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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Policy Shock
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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as productivity ηpt and demand η
β
t . However, I do find that shocks to individual sectors yield
differing results. For this reason, impulse response functions these broad-based shocks are
reserved for the appendix.15
3.4.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis: Sector-Specific Shocks
The next impulse response analysis considers a cost-push shock in the consumption goods
sector ηs.ct , which is translated as an exogenous occurrence that decreases the price markup
by one percentage point. Figure (3.12) shows the response of the consumption goods-sector
variables to this shock. In this sector, such an innovation is seen as a supply shock, with
output rising and inflation falling. As the price falls, the household will increase their labor
hours in that sector, producing more and causing wages to fall initially. This fall in the
wage rate causes an immediate surge in profits for the intermediate goods-producing firms.
All of these occurrences are typical of a standard supply shock, but for the health services
sector it translates into a demand shock, which is shown in Figure (3.13). Here we see a
substitution effect in which the households demand more consumption goods and less health
services. Thus, in this sector we see decreases in both output and inflation. The base cause
of this is in the real price of health services, which is simply the ratio of the price level
for health services to that of consumption goods. The 1.5% decrease in inflation in the
consumption sector outweighs the 0.7% fall in health services inflation. This drives the real
price of health services up by one percent, causing demand and labor hours to fall. What is
interesting, though, is that profits for the intermediate goods-producing firms in this sector
rise substantially in the face of falling demand. This is due, for the most part, to a falling
wage rate along with the falling labor hours. Typically simple supply and demand dynamics
move these two variables in opposite directions, but since the shock originated in the larger
sector of the economy, where it materializes as a supply shock, this drove down the wage
15The impacts of these aggregate shocks are not identical, but strikingly close. This is essentially by design
since the consumption good and health services sectors are modeled identically outside their parameteriza-
tion, specifically the calibration of price stickiness. Thus, an aggregate shock will impact both sectors, and
consequently the aggregate, in very similar fashions.
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rate overall.
When looking at the aggregate economy, this supply shock once again manifests itself as
a demand shock as seen in Figure (3.14). This is due to the high level of substitutability
between consumption goods and health services. Notice that output in the consumption
goods sector only increases by approximately 0.03% at its highest point, while output in
the health services sector falls by 0.5%. This translates into a decrease in overall output by
about 0.1%. Overall inflation falls by nearly 1.5% at the same time. With falls in the wage
rate and overall labor hours, we see fiscal revenues fall by approximately 3% at its lowest
point and fiscal debt rise. Real levels of debt see larger increases than one would expect due
to the fact that; while interest rates do fall, making debt cheaper; inflation rates fall by a
larger percent, pushing the real value of future debt higher. As the wage rate bounces back
quickly, even overshooting the original level, revenues are replenished and debt falls back to
its steady state level. Something that is also worth noting is the increase in impact from
this shock at the aggregate level when monetary policy makers move from the narrow to the
broad inflation regime. I find a considerable increase in the variability in the economy from
this shock. This is due to the fact that, under the broad measure regime, monetary policy
reacts less strongly to adjustments in inflation from a single sector. Since the consumption
goods sector is by far the larger of the two sectors, changes in its inflation rate can cause
larger swings in variable movements at the aggregate level.
Similarly, I present the impulse response functions for a cost-push shock in the health
services sector of the model. This shock represents a reduction in the price markup on health
services by about one percentage point. As before, it manifests itself as a typical supply shock
in the health services market, as seen in Figure (3.16). Inflation falls and output increases
due to a decrease in the real price of health services. Contrary to before, profits for the
health services sector fall because of increased labor costs. These increased labor costs come
from the increase in labor hours as well as the increase of the real price-adjusted wage rate
wt/pt in that sector. In Figure (3.15), I find that output in the consumption goods sector does
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Figure 3.12: Consumption-Sector Variables
to Cost-Push Shock in the Consumption Sec-
tor
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Figure 3.13: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Cost-Push Shock in the Consumption Sec-
tor
Note: The black, solid lines represent the impulse response functions under what I call the
narrow monetary policy regime, which considers expectations of the CPI-like πct inflation
measure. The blue, dashed lines represent the impulse response functions under what I call
the broad monetary policy regime, which considers expectations of the PCE-like πt inflation
measure.
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Figure 3.14: Aggregate Variables to Cost-Push
Shock in the Consumption Sector
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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not respond much to the shock initially. Interestingly, though, the immediate realization of
the shock depends on the monetary policy regime. In both instances inflation falls, but if
policy makers use the narrow inflation measurement, output increases slightly and the shock
seems to come from the supply side. If policy makers use the broad inflation measurement,
the shock looks like it comes from the demand side. Since the wage rate falls and labor
hours are fairly stable in this sector, profits for the consumption sector actually increase.
At the aggregate level (Figure 3.17), this shock manifests itself as a supply shock. This is
rather intuitive since its impact on the consumption goods sector is minimal. From a fiscal
accounting point of view, decreased wages outweigh increased labor hours, pushing household
income and fiscal revenues down and fiscal debt up. The extent to which debt increases again
depends on the monetary policy regime. From the perspective of the health services sector,
use of the broad inflation measurement dampens this shock, keeping debt levels lower overall.
What these impulse responses show is that, while the choice of monetary policy regime may
not matter for innovations impacting the overall economy, it is possible that sector-specific
shocks can impact the economy in significantly different ways. In generality, it seems that
if monetary policy makers consider an inflation measure that excludes all or portions of a
specific sector, then shocks to that sector can be dramatically amplified. This is similar to the
macro-prudential policy literature which is now considering the inclusion of price movements
in the financial markets. The consumer price index does not include the value of financial
services that are either free or not paid for by the household directly, meaning that use of
such a measurement could cause amplification of shocks originating in that sector.
3.4.4.3 Trends Over Time: Simulated Moments
In this section I expand on the analysis of the previous section and consider simulated
moments of the variables in the model. This allows me to consider what might happen in the
long term, given that the true economy is not hit by one shock at a time. Specifically, these
moments are calculated by randomly drawing the structural shocks from normal distributions
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Figure 3.15: Consumption-Sector Variables
to Cost-Push Shock in the Health Sector
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Figure 3.16: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Cost-Push Shock in the Health Sector
Note: Again, the black, solid lines represent the impulse response functions under the narrow
monetary policy regime while the blue, dashed lines represent the impulse response functions
under the broad monetary policy regime.
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Note: Again, with a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is
in levels, or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in
percent deviations from steady state.
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with their given specifications. The model is then simulated for 20,000 periods, after which
the means and standard deviations are calculated. The results are shown in the tables
below, along with the percentage change seen when moving from the CPI-based measure
to the broader measure of inflation. It needs to be noted that these results come under
the assumption that the response parameters in the monetary policy rule remain unchanged
from one regime to another and that I assume that the monetary/fiscal mix is active/passive.
Thus, all else held constant, what happens if policy makers simply change their input from
one measure of inflation to another. The means of the variables are shown in Table 3.3.
As can be seen here, overall, the average values of the variables do not change much at all.
The major changes are seen in downward pressure on inflation rates and fiscal debt levels.
It is interesting to note the fall in inflation rates in the early 2000s, which fell under the
broad monetary policy regime at the time. Recall that the inflation variables in the table
are expressed in gross terms. Converting these shows that a 0.01% decrease in the gross
variables is equivalent to approximately a 0.56% decrease in the net variables. While this is
still small, the downward pressure on inflation while maintaining the same values for nearly
all of the other variables seems similar to the early 2000s era. Table 3.4 presents the percent
change in the standard deviations of the variables when monetary policy moves from one
regime to the other. Note that the standard deviations of nearly all variables increase, the
source of which can be found in the table through monetary policy. Just as was shown in the
impulse responses, shocks to the larger sectors are amplified when monetary policy considers
the inflation rates from smaller sectors dually. This is due to the fact that interest rates
no longer adjust as much to changes in inflation from that particular sector, as shown in
the reduced standard deviation of the interest rate. This also matches the trends seen in
Figure 3.6, where the standard deviations of many of the factors increases while the standard
deviation of the federal funds rate falls. Recall that these factors represent the general trends
of 115 economic indicators, presenting a parsimonious illustration of the economy as a whole.
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Inflation Measure
Variable Narrow Broad % Change
Consumable Goods: Household (ct) 0.410 0.410 0.00
Health Services: Household (ht) 0.387 0.387 0.00
Total Labor Supply (lt) 0.334 0.334 0.00
Consumption Labor Supply (lct ) 0.204 0.204 0.00
Healthcare Labor Supply (lht ) 0.130 0.130 0.00
Health Status (xt) 0.114 0.114 0.00
Aggregate Output (yt) 0.934 0.934 0.00
Consumer Goods Output (yct ) 0.609 0.609 0.00
Healthcare Goods Output (yht ) 0.388 0.388 0.00
Inflation: Aggregate (πt) 1.023 1.023 −0.01
Inflation: Consumer Goods (πct ) 1.023 1.023 −0.01
Inflation: Healthcare Goods (πht ) 1.023 1.023 −0.01
Gross Nominal Interest Rate (rt) 1.043 1.043 −0.01
Real Price of Health Services (pht ) 1.084 1.084 0.00
Real Wage Rate (wt) 2.492 2.492 −0.00
Profit: Consumer Goods Sector (dct) 0.100 0.100 0.00
Profit: Healthcare Goods Sector (dht ) 0.089 0.089 0.00
Tax Rate (τt) 0.240 0.240 −0.00
Transfers (tt) −0.000 −0.000 −0.30
Consumer Goods: Government (gct ) 0.200 0.200 0.00
Health Services: Government (ght ) 0.000 0.000 0.00
Fiscal Revenues (τtwtlt) 0.200 0.200 −0.00
Fiscal Debt (bt) −0.011 −0.012 −2.05
Marginal Utility of Consumption (Λt) 20.793 20.793 −0.00
Table 3.3: Simulated Means
Note: These standard deviations are calculated by simulating the model for 20,000 periods
using the parameters as estimated in Table 3.5 for each respective model. The percent
change is calculated by taking the difference and dividing by the values found in the “Narrow”
column.
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Inflation Measure
Variable Narrow Broad % Change
Consumable Goods: Household (ct) 0.032 0.032 0.35
Health Services: Household (ht) 0.040 0.041 1.76
Total Labor Supply (lt) 0.024 0.024 0.90
Consumption Labor Supply (lct ) 0.016 0.016 −0.10
Healthcare Labor Supply (lht ) 0.012 0.012 2.58
Health Status (xt) 0.019 0.019 −0.06
Aggregate Output (yt) 0.058 0.058 0.77
Consumer Goods Output (yct ) 0.033 0.034 0.33
Healthcare Goods Output (yht ) 0.042 0.043 1.70
Inflation: Aggregate (πt) 0.121 0.123 1.47
Inflation: Consumer Goods (πct ) 0.125 0.127 1.58
Inflation: Healthcare Goods (πht ) 0.109 0.110 1.04
Gross Nominal Interest Rate (rt) 0.119 0.118 −1.28
Real Price of Health Services (pht ) 0.047 0.048 2.81
Real Wage Rate (wt) 0.403 0.418 3.69
Profit: Consumer Goods Sector (dct) 0.090 0.093 3.35
Profit: Healthcare Goods Sector (dht ) 0.071 0.073 3.26
Tax Rate (τt) 0.202 0.210 4.23
Transfers (tt) 0.003 0.003 1.12
Consumer Goods: Government (gct ) 0.010 0.010 0.00
Health Services: Government (ght ) 0.010 0.010 0.00
Fiscal Revenues (τtwtlt) 0.192 0.200 4.23
Fiscal Debt (bt) 0.339 0.354 4.42
Marginal Utility of Consumption (Λt) 6.256 6.285 0.47
Table 3.4: Simulated Standard Deviations
Note: These standard deviations are calculated by simulating the model for 20,000 periods
using the parameters as estimated in Table 3.5 for each respective model. The percent
change is calculated by taking the difference and dividing by the values found in the “Narrow”
column.
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3.4.5 Estimating the Policy Functions
As stated above, I now consider the data to estimate the policy functions in the model.
This gives me at least an idea of where these parameters may fall. However, it is important
to note that these rules are very simple and therefore the true values of these parameters
may be subject to measurement and/or model specification error such as that described by
Rudebusch (2002, 2006) and others.
3.4.5.1 Data and Results
After considering the parameter space in the above sections, I now estimate the monetary
policy rule (3.8) above using nonlinear least squares. The data are quarterly and are ex-
pressed in annualized terms during the period 1981:Q1–2008:Q4. For this exercise, I use
the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank’s one-year expected CPI inflation for the period
1981Q3–1999Q4 and the Greenbook one-year ahead forecast of PCE inflation for the period
2000Q1–2008Q4, just as those utilized by Mehra and Minton (2007) and Mehra and Sawh-
ney (2010). Additionally, I use the effective federal funds rate and output growth rate as
provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (FRED). Since there is a break in the Fed-
eral Reserves target variable from CPI to PCE inflation in the first quarter of 2000, I break
down the analysis into two groups. For added simplification, and after extensive robustness
checks, I continue to assume that the monetary policy rule is strictly targeting inflation,
fixing ρy = 0. As can be seen in the determinacy regions above, the response to the growth
rate of output has no impact on the dynamics at least within the vicinity of the parameter’s
estimate and the framework of this model. The estimates are provided in Table 3.5. The
response to inflation, for the most part, has satisfied the Taylor-principle, but this response
dipped slightly after the turn of the century.16
For the fiscal policy rule, annual data must be used. Thus, I consider the average federal
16Even thought the parameter estimate for ρπ falls below unity in the second subsample, it is not statis-
tically different from the fist subsample estimate, a result found in the empirical estimates of Mehra and
Sawhney (2010).
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Table 3.5: Parameter Estimates for Policy Rules
Monetary Policy∗
(a) (b)
1981Q3–1999Q4 2000Q1–2008Q4
ρr 0.8137 0.9378
(0.0766) (0.0589)
ρπ 1.0222 0.9964
(0.0033) (0.0231)
Fiscal Policy?
1981–2011
ρτ 0.9421
(0.0136)
γτ 0.2259
(0.0499)
ρt 0.9481
(0.0396)
γt 0.0326
(0.0721)
Equilibrium Probability†
Indeterminate 0.00 0.00
Determinate 55.74 55.65
No Solution 44.26 44.35
∗ Monetary policy parameters are estimated using quarterly data and nonlinear least squares.
The values in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
? Fiscal policy parameters are estimated using annual data from 1981-2011 since quarterly
data is unavailable. Therefore, the changes in the probabilities are caused purely by changes
in the monetary policy parameters.
† Probabilities are expressed as a percent and evaluated by drawing 50,000 times from normal
distributions with the given moments and applying them to the model. Each result is simply
the number of times the parameter selection resulted in the dynamic property divided by
the total number of draws.
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tax rate as estimated by the NBER and the annual percent change in real personal income
from 1960–2011. Additionally, for ease of estimation and to reflect the goal of fiscal policy
makers, I assume that the tax code is perfectly indexed for inflation. While this is far from
the actual scenario, the lack of data requires me to make these simplifying assumptions.
Along with the empirical estimates of the policy rules, I also include the probability of
the model being parametrically located in each of the determinacy regions shown above. As
can be seen, the probability of the model being indeterminate is zero, reflecting the push
just before this sample period by the Volcker administration to get out of the high volatility
environment. Additionally, we see that the probability of either a unique solution or no
solution to the model does not change much, a parallel to the lack of substantial change in
the determinacy regions mentioned above.
3.4.5.2 Determinacy Regions
Since the determinacy regions presented above were subjected to some fairly strong assump-
tions with regards to the parameter values, I now present them with the estimated values.
Figure (3.18) shows that these regions are quite sensitive to the smoothing parameter ρτ ,
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Figure 3.18: Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Estimated Parameter Values
which was set to unity prior to this exercise. Since the value of γτ is much lower than the
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original specification, changes to this parameter do not substantially alter the probability
of achieving determinacy. The area defined as the passive/active monetary/fiscal regime
remains unaltered.
3.4.5.3 Impulse Response Analysis
Here I present the impulse response functions for the two models. This time, however, I
use the estimated values of the monetary and fiscal policy parameters. These values place
the model under the category of fiscal theory of the price level in which monetary policy is
passive and fiscal policy is active. More specifically, the model lies in the lower-left quadrant
of the parameter space of Figure (3.18). The first thing to notice is that the initial impact of
each shock is dramatically reduced under this regime. This is primarily due to the fact that,
both active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy result in a small amount of change to
the policy variables. The second thing to notice is that the dynamics of the impulse response
functions are much cleaner than what was seen prior. Here, the variables adjust and then
return to steady state in a monotonic manner, whereas the responses under the previous
regime were subject to oscillations. Next, notice that there is virtually no difference between
the two models in most of the variables. Below I present the impulse response functions for
the monetary policy and sector-specific supply shocks, just as before. The remaining impulse
response functions can be found in the appendix.
Just as with the empirical model and the active/passive scenario above, the efficacy
of monetary policy needs to be addressed. To do so in a simple fashion, I analyze the
impulse response function to a sudden change in the federal funds rate. Since this model is
parameterized under the passive monetary and active fiscal policies, the dynamic impact of
an innovation to the interest rate changes. The results are shown in Figures (3.19)–(3.21). As
can be seen the variables react in nearly identical fashion regardless of the monetary regime,
but notice that inflation actually moves with the change in interest rates (albeit lagged).
The way these models are constructed, the monetary policy rule typically determines the
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inflation rate. However, since this is a PM/AF scenario, rising interest rates put upward
pressure on debt levels, so the fiscal authority raises prices to inflate real debt away. The
lack of change in the impulse responses when moving from one monetary policy regime to
another matches the trend seen in Figure (3.5). In both situations there is little difference
between the reactions of the variables when monetary policy targets narrow inflation and
when it targets broad inflation.
Next consider the impact of a cost-push shock in the consumption good sector. Figure
(3.22) presents the results in the consumption good sector, in which the shock originated.
Here the general movements of the variables are the same as shown above. As a standard
supply-side shock, output in this sector rises while the inflation rate falls. Figure (3.23),
again, shows that this supply-side innovation manifests itself as a demand shock in the
health services sector, with both output and the inflation rate falling. Output in the health
services sector falls so much more drastically than in the consumption sector since the real
(or relative) price level in the health services sector increases dramatically. At the aggregate
level, Figure (3.24) shows again that this supply-side shock from the consumption sector
shows up as a demand shock at the aggregate level due to the disproportionate impact on
the two sectors. Once again, I find upward pressure on fiscal debt under the broad monetary
policy regime relative to its narrow counterpart. This is due to the fact that interest rates,
which are very persistent under this specification, do not fall by as much under the broad
regime. This stems from the fact that while inflation in the consumer goods sector falls by
0.4%, the shock only pushes inflation rates in the health services sector by 0.17%, resulting
in the aggregate inflation rate not falling by as much as that in the consumer good sector.
Since the input of the monetary policy rule is not as volatile under the broad regime, interest
rates are also not as volatile, but higher interest rates mean a higher cost of borrowing for
the fiscal authority, pushing up debt levels.
Next consider an analogous shock to the health services sector. Figure (3.26) presents
the impulse response functions for the variables in the health services sector. Notice that,
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Figure 3.19: Consumption-Sector Variables
to Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 3.20: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Monetary Policy Shock
Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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Figure 3.21: Aggregate Variables to Monetary
Policy Shock
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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Figure 3.22: Consumption-Sector to Cost-
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Figure 3.23: Health Services-Sector to Cost-
Push Shock in the Consumption Sector
Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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Figure 3.24: Aggregate Variables to Cost-Push
Shock in the Consumption Sector
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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in this sector, the choice of monetary policy regime does not matter much. This is at least
partly due to the small relative size of this sector relative to the other. In fact, the shape
of the impulse responses are almost identical to those shown earlier. This shock impacts
this market as a standard supply-side innovation should, pushing inflation rates down while
increasing output. The main difference between this set of impulse responses and those from
the earlier analysis is that the shock has a dramatically diminished impact on the economy.
Recall that this shock had different impacts on the consumption goods sector depending on
the monetary policy regime in the previous analysis. Under one regime, it manifested itself
as a demand shock, while showing up as a supply shock under the other regime. With this
new parameterization, a cost-push shock in the health care sector is seen as a demand-side
innovation in the consumption good sector due to the large impact on the relative price.
At the aggregate level, Figure (3.27) shows that this supply-side shock does reveals itself
as a supply-side innovation at the aggregate level. This time, unlike the previous analysis, the
interest rate under the broad regime is higher than under the narrow regime, causing upward
pressure on fiscal debt levels. Before, a cost-push shock to this sector actually decreased the
pressure on fiscal debt because the shock impacted the health services sector enough to
overcome the small weighting, pushing aggregate inflation (and thus, interest rates) lower
than inflation in the consumption good sector. Here, the impact on the health services sector
does not overcome the small weighting, meaning that aggregate inflation (and thus, interest
rates) do not fall as much. This puts more upward pressure on the level of fiscal debt.
3.4.5.4 Simulated Moments of the Model
Just as in the previous analysis, I now turn to the simulated moments in the model under
the different regimes using the estimated parameter values. This gives us a longer-term
look at the impact of the differing monetary policy regimes. It needs to be noted that the
values reported here are sensitive to the number of periods under which the simulation is
considered. This is due to the fact that the estimated parameter values are very close to the
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Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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determinacy/no solution boundary, meaning that the variables can be very persistent. This
has already been seen in the impulse response analysis, where interest rates fell and remained
low for a significant time. Therefore, to attain somewhat reliable and stable results, these
simulations are carried out for 200,000 periods. Table (3.6) presents the simulated means of
the variables under both regimes as well as the percent change from the narrow regime to
the broad regime. As can be seen, most of classic variables from the consumption good and
health services sectors remain nearly unchanged. The larger changes start with monetary
policy, where increased inflation rates (around 150 basis points) causes a need for higher
interest rates. These small increases in inflation and in the interest rate cause large (in
percent terms) upward pressure on fiscal debt levels. What this says is that, under the
estimated policy rules, the economy could see added fiscal pressure simply due to a change
in the measure of inflation monetary policy targets.
Not only am I concerned with the simulated means of the variables, but the simulated
standard deviations should also be addressed in this case. Table (3.7) provides the results
from the simulations. The first thing to notice is that, while the basic variables did not
adjust much in terms of their means, the adjustment of the standard deviations is much
more pronounced. Output-related variables such as consumption, health services, and their
aggregates saw their standard deviations increased by as much as six percent from one
regime to the other. The only variables in these sectors that see decreases in their standard
deviations are the labor supply variables and the firm profits, which are obviously tied to
labor supply. An interesting phenomenon to note is that, while the simulated mean of the
fiscal debt level increases dramatically, its standard deviation actually decreases by almost
1.5%. So what we see is a higher, yet more stable, level of government debt when monetary
policy moves from the narrow to the broad regime.
Comparing the results of this scenario to the empirical results found above is a little
less straight forward. While I do find increases in standard deviations across the board, I
also find increases in the standard deviation of the federal funds rate. The former matches
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Variable Narrow Broad %∆
Consumable Goods: Household (ct) 0.411 0.411 0.04
Health Services: Household (ht) 0.389 0.389 0.12
Total Labor Supply (lt) 0.333 0.334 0.06
Consumption Labor Supply (lct ) 0.204 0.204 0.03
Healthcare Labor Supply (lht ) 0.130 0.130 0.12
Health Status (xt) 0.115 0.115 0.02
Aggregate Output (yt) 0.937 0.937 0.05
Consumer Goods Output (yct ) 0.611 0.611 0.03
Healthcare Goods Output (yht ) 0.389 0.389 0.12
Inflation: Aggregate (πt) 1.022 1.037 1.49
Inflation: Consumer Goods (πct ) 1.022 1.037 1.49
Inflation: Healthcare Goods (πht ) 1.022 1.037 1.49
Gross Nominal Interest Rate (rt) 1.042 1.058 1.49
Real Price of Health Services (pht ) 1.086 1.085 −0.06
Real Wage Rate (wt) 2.499 2.501 0.09
Profit: Consumer Goods Sector (dct) 0.102 0.101 −0.42
Profit: Healthcare Goods Sector (dht ) 0.090 0.090 −0.37
Tax Rate (τt) 0.240 0.240 −0.00
Transfers (tt) −0.000 −0.000 21.61
Consumer Goods: Government (gct ) 0.200 0.200 0.00
Health Services: Government (ght ) −0.000 −0.000 0.00
Fiscal Revenues (τtwtlt) 0.200 0.200 0.15
Fiscal Debt (bt) 0.002 0.018 901.82
Marginal Utility of Consumption (Λt) 20.611 20.594 −0.08
Table 3.6: Simulated Means under AF/PM Regime
Note: These standard deviations are calculated by simulating the model for 200,000 periods
using the parameters as estimated in Table 3.5 for each respective model. The percent
change is calculated by taking the difference and dividing by the values found in the “Narrow”
column.
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Variable Narrow Broad %∆
Consumable Goods: Household (ct) 0.033 0.033 2.77
Health Services: Household (ht) 0.030 0.032 6.34
Total Labor Supply (lt) 0.033 0.032 −1.62
Consumption Labor Supply (lct ) 0.018 0.017 −0.88
Healthcare Labor Supply (lht ) 0.016 0.016 −2.00
Health Status (xt) 0.019 0.019 0.70
Aggregate Output (yt) 0.054 0.057 4.45
Consumer Goods Output (yct ) 0.034 0.035 2.52
Healthcare Goods Output (yht ) 0.033 0.035 5.22
Inflation: Aggregate (πt) 0.224 0.232 3.17
Inflation: Consumer Goods (πct ) 0.226 0.233 3.08
Inflation: Healthcare Goods (πht ) 0.219 0.227 3.47
Gross Nominal Interest Rate (rt) 0.209 0.220 5.39
Real Price of Health Services (pht ) 0.040 0.037 −6.38
Real Wage Rate (wt) 0.335 0.344 2.85
Profit: Consumer Goods Sector (dct) 0.094 0.094 −0.64
Profit: Healthcare Goods Sector (dht ) 0.061 0.060 −1.39
Tax Rate (τt) 0.042 0.043 1.13
Transfers (tt) 0.001 0.002 5.20
Consumer Goods: Government (gct ) 0.010 0.010 0.00
Health Services: Government (ght ) 0.010 0.010 0.00
Fiscal Revenues (τtwtlt) 0.074 0.075 1.06
Fiscal Debt (bt) 0.311 0.307 −1.47
Marginal Utility of Consumption (Λt) 4.974 5.110 2.74
Table 3.7: Simulated Standard Deviations under AF/PM Regime
Note: These standard deviations are calculated by simulating the model for 200,000 periods
using the parameters as estimated in Table 3.5 for each respective model. The percent
change is calculated by taking the difference and dividing by the values found in the “Narrow”
column.
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the empirics, while the latter does not. This can be partially explained by the status of
monetary and fiscal policy. The active fiscal/passive monetary policy relationship forces
monetary policy to adjust its interest rates in order to maintain the stationarity of real fiscal
debt levels. This could lead to larger adjustments in the long run since monetary policy is
not being proactive against inflation.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I explore the dynamic impact of monetary policy makers moving from a nar-
rower to a broader measure of inflation in their policy rules, while fiscal policy makers
maintain the narrower measure for indexation purposes. Using a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with two production sectors and nominal rigidities at the intermediate
production level, I find that the impact of this regime switch on fiscal debt levels depends
greatly on the coordination efforts between monetary and fiscal policy. Under the standard
active monetary and passive fiscal policy assumption, this regime shift has very little impact
on the levels of basic household variables while putting downward pressure on fiscal debt
levels. However, the shift does put upward pressure on standard deviations of most of the
model’s variables while reducing that of the policy instrument. This is due to the fact that
monetary policy moves to a target that averages out perturbations in more volatile sectors
with those of more stable sectors, meaning that the policy instrument will not respond in as
dramatic a fashion. So even though the determinacy properties of the model remain mostly
unaltered, there is still an impact on the general dynamics of the economy.
Expanding on this by considering the data and estimating the true stance of both policy
makers, I find that the model just falls under the passive monetary and active fiscal policy
(AF/PM) combination. By “just”, I mean that the parameterization of this model is very
close to the active/active combination, which makes the model determinate, but very persis-
tent. When considering a regime shift in this scenario, I find that there are modest increases
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in the levels of the classic variables, but there is substantial upward pressure on fiscal debt
levels. The interest rate does not adjust as strongly to consumer-sector inflation as it did
before, keeping it higher on average. Also because of this, I again find increased standard
deviations of most variables not dependent on labor supply. The only additional variable
with a lower standard deviation in this scenario is the fiscal debt, suggesting that this regime
could cause increased, yet more stable, levels of debt.
What all of these results imply is that moving from a narrower inflation target to a broader
target has mixed results on the levels of fiscal debt, but in all scenarios I find increased
standard deviations. This matches the results from a TVP-FAVAR model nearly identical
to that of Korobilis (2009), showing that standard deviations of economic indicators began
to rise in the early 2000s, shortly after the Federal Reserve changed its targeted inflation
measure. Specifically, I find that under the AF/PM regime, the model shows increased levels
of real fiscal debt and increased variations in the remaining economic indicators, which is
similar to the statistical trends seen since the monetary policy adjustment.
Further work on this subject could include other tax rates besides a simple wage income
tax, perhaps in an overall tax rule which includes all forms of incomes to better correspond
to the generalized data available. The addition of capital and financial markets, as well as
introducing matching mechanisms to the labor and government debt markets could make the
results richer as well. Such matching mechanisms would allow policy makers to include the
unemployment rate to its monetary rule, which is part of the dual mandate and corresponds
to the empirical estimates of monetary policy rules. As noted above, Anand and Prasad
(2010) show that welfare-maximizing monetary policy is dependent on where the nominal
rigidities are located, concluding that targeting core inflation measures is only optimal when
the only friction is derived from price stickiness. Simultaneously, adding a matching market
to government debt would allow the quantity of debt to be supply-driven, while the price of
the debt is equilibrium-driven.
117
Bibliography
Alcidi, C., Flamini, A. and Fracasso, A. (2011) Policy Regime Changes, Judgment and Taylor
Rules in the Greenspan Era, Economica, 78, 89–107.
Anand, R. and Prasad, E. S. (2010) Optimal Price Indices for Targeting Inflation Under In-
complete Markets, NBER Working Papers 16290, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Aoki, K. (2001) Optimal Monetary Policy Responses to Relative-Price Changes, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 48, 55–80.
Arias, A., Hansen, G. and Ohanian, L. (2007) Why have Business Cycle Fluctuations become
less Volatile?, Economic Theory, 32, 43–58.
Arrow, K. J., Chenery, H. B., Minhas, B. S. and Solow, R. M. (1961) Capital-Labor Substi-
tution and Economic Efficiency, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 43, pp. 225–250.
Belongia, M. T. and Ireland, P. N. (2012) The Barnett Critique After Three Decades: A
New Keynesian Analysis, NBER Working Papers 17885, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Bernanke, B., Boivin, J. and Eliasz, P. S. (2005) Measuring the Effects of Monetary Policy:
A Factor-augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach, The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 120, 387–422.
Bianchi, F. (2012) Evolving Monetary/Fiscal Policy Mix in the United States, American
Economic Review, 102, 167–72.
Bils, M. and Klenow, P. J. (2004) Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices, Journal
of Political Economy, 112, 947–985.
118
Blair, C. (2014) Constructing a PCE-Weighted Consumer Price Index, in Improving the
Measurement of Consumer Expenditures, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
NBER Chapters.
Blanchard, O. and Simon, J. (2001) The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 32, 135–174.
Blanchard, O. J. and Kahn, C. M. (1980) The Solution of Linear Difference Models under
Rational Expectations, Econometrica, 48, 1305–11.
Bloom, N., Griffith, R. and Van Reenen, J. (2000) Do R&D Credits Work? Evidence From A
Panel Of Countries 1979-97, CEPR Discussion Papers 2415, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Bosco, R. J. and Davis, K. M. (2012) Impact of Eliminating the Penny on the United States
Mint’s Costs and Profit in Fiscal Year 2011, Report, Navigant Consulting, Inc.
Campbell, J. Y. and Mankiw, N. G. (1989) Consumption, Income and Interest Rates: Rein-
terpreting the Time Series Evidence, in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, pp. 185–246.
Carroll, R., Holtz-Eakin, D., Rider, M. and Rosen, H. (2000) Income Taxes and En-
trepreneurs’ Use of Labor, Journal of Labor Economics, 18, 324–51.
Carroll, R., Holtz-Eakin, D., Rider, M. and Rosen, H. S. (2001) Personal Income Taxes and
the Growth of Small Firms, in Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 15, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, pp. 121–148.
Chande, D. and Fisher, T. C. G. (2003) Have a Penny? Need a Penny? Eliminating the
One-Cent Coin from Circulation, Canadian Public Policy, 29, 511–517.
Chen, S.-H. and Guo, J.-T. (2013) Progressive Taxation and Macroeconomic (In)stability
with Productive Government Spending, Journal of Dynamics and Control, 37, 951–963.
119
Cipolla, C. (1956) Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to
Seventeenth Century, Charles Phelps Taft Memorial Fund. Lectures, Published for the
University of Cincinnati by Princeton University Press.
Clarida, R., Galí, J. and Gertler, M. (2000) Monetary Policy Rules And Macroeconomic
Stability: Evidence And Some Theory, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 147–
180.
Clark, T. E. (1999) A Comparison of the CPI and the PCE Price Index, Economic Review,
pp. 15–29.
Coibion, O. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2011) Monetary Policy, Trend Inflation, and the Great
Moderation: An Alternative Interpretation, American Economic Review, 101, 341–70.
Croushore, D. (2008) Revisions to PCE Inflation Measures: Implications for Monetary Pol-
icy, Working Papers 08-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Davig, T. and Leeper, E. M. (2011) Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and Fiscal Stimulus,
European Economic Review, 55, 211–227.
Del Negro, M. and Otrok, C. (2008) Dynamic Factor Models with Time-Varying Parameters:
Measuring Changes in International Business Cycles, Tech. rep.
Dixit, A. K. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1977) Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity, American Economic Review, 67, 297–308.
Dokko, J., Doyle, B., Kiley, M. T., Kim, J., Sherlund, S., Sim, J. and den Heuvel, S. V.
(2009) Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, Tech. rep.
Dranove, D., Shanley, M. and White, W. D. (1993) Price and Concentration in Hospital
Markets: The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competition, Journal of Law
and Economics, 36, 179–204.
120
Du, J. and Yagihashi, T. (2015) Health Care Inflation and Its Implications for Monetary
Policy, Economic Inquiry, Forethcoming.
Erceg, C. and Levin, A. (2006) Optimal Monetary Policy with Durable Consumption Goods,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 1341–1359.
Galí, J. (2009) Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the
New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press.
Galí, J. and Gambetti, L. (2009) On the Sources of the Great Moderation, American Eco-
nomic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1, 26–57.
Galí, J., López-Salido, J. D. and Vallés, J. (2007) Understanding the Effects of Government
Spending on Consumption, Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 227–270.
Guo, J.-T. and Lansing, K. (1998) Indeterminacy and Stabilization Policy, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 82, 481–490.
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (2007) The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 39–72.
Iacoviello, M. (2005) House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the
Business Cycle, American Economic Review, 95, 739–764.
Ireland, P. N. (2000) Interest rates, inflation, and federal reserve policy since 1980, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 32, 417–34.
Ireland, P. N. (2004) Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model, The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 86, 923–936.
Ireland, P. N. (2012) The Macroeconomic Effects of Interest on Reserves, NBER Working
Papers 18409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Keating, J. and Valcarcel, V. (2012) Greater Moderations, Economics Letters, 115, 168–171.
121
Kim, C.-J. and Nelson, C. R. (1999) State-Space Models with Regime Switching: Classical
and Gibbs-Sampling Approaches with Applications, vol. 1 of MIT Press Books, The MIT
Press.
King, R. G. and Watson, M. W. (1996) Money, Prices, Interest Rates and the Business
Cycle, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 35–53.
Koop, G. (2003) Bayesian Econometrics, Wiley.
Korobilis, D. (2009) Assessing the Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks Using Dynamic
Factor Models, Working Papers 0914, University of Strathclyde Business School, Depart-
ment of Economics.
Leeper, E. M. (1991) Equilibria Under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and Fiscal Policies,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 27, 129–147.
Leeper, E. M. and Zhou, X. (2013) Inflation’s Role in Optimal Monetary-Fiscal Policy,
NBER Working Papers 19686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Lombra, R. E. (2001) Eliminating the Penny from the U.S. Coinage System: An Economic
Analysis, Eastern Economic Journal, 27, 433–442.
Lombra, R. E. (2007) Pennies, Pricing, and Rounding: Is all the Relevant Analysis In?,
Eastern Economic Journal, 33, 147–152.
Mankiw, N. G. (2000) The Savers-Spenders Theory of Fiscal Policy, American Economic
Review, 90, 120–125.
McDonald, J. and Stokes, H. (2013) Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, The Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 46, 437–451.
Mehra, Y. P. and Minton, B. D. (2007) A Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era, Economic
Quarterly, pp. 229–250.
122
Mehra, Y. P. and Sawhney, B. (2010) Inflation Measure, Taylor Rules, and the Greenspan-
Bernanke Years, Economic Quarterly, pp. 123–151.
Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F. (1981) A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914–27.
Mishkin, F. S. (2008) Does Stabilizing Inflation Contribute To Stabilizing Economic Activ-
ity?, NBER Working Papers 13970, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Orphanides, A. (2003) The Quest for Prosperity without Inflation, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50, 633–663.
Orphanides, A. (2004) Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Inflation: A
View from the Trenches, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36, 151–75.
Orphanides, A. and van Norden, S. (2002) The Unreliability of Output-Gap Estimates in
Real Time, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 569–583.
Orphanides, A. and Wieland, V. (2008) Economic Projections and Rules of Thumb for
Monetary Policy, Review, pp. 307–324.
Primiceri, G. E. (2005) Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Pol-
icy, Review of Economic Studies, 72, 821–852.
Rich, R. and Steindel, C. (2007) A Comparison of Measures of Core Inflation, Economic
Policy Review, pp. 19–38.
Rogerson, R. and Wallenius, J. (2009) Micro and Macro Elasticities in a Life Cycle Model
with Taxes, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2277–2292.
Rogoff, K. S. (2014) Costs and Benefits to Phasing Out Paper Currency, NBER Working
Papers 20126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
123
Rolnick, A. J. and Weber, W. E. (1986) Gresham’s Law or Gresham’s Fallacy?, Quarterly
Review, pp. 17–24.
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (2010) The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Es-
timates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks, American Economic Review, 100,
763–801.
Rotemberg, J. J. (1982) Sticky Prices in the United States, Journal of Political Economy,
90, 1187–1211.
Rudebusch, G. D. (2002) Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and Monetary
Policy Inertia, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 1161–1187.
Rudebusch, G. D. (2006) Monetary Policy Inertia: Fact or Fiction?, International Journal
of Central Banking, 2.
Sargent, T. J. and Velde, F. R. (1999) The Big Problem of Small Change, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 31, pp. 137–161.
Sargent, T. J. and Wallace, N. (1981) Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, Quarterly
Review.
Sims, C. A. (1994) A Simple Model for Study of the Determination of the Price Level and
the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy, Economic Theory, 4, 381–99.
Sims, E. and Wolff, J. (2013) The Output and Welfare Effects of Government Spending
Shocks over the Business Cycle, NBER Working Papers 19749, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.
Smets, F. and Wouters, R. (2003) An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
Model of the Euro Area, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 1123–1175.
Smith, B. D. and Sargent, T. J. (1997) Coinage, Debasements, and Gresham’s Laws, Eco-
nomic Theory, 10, 197–226.
124
Stiroh, K. J. (2009) Volatility Accounting: A Production Perspective on Increased Economic
Stability, Journal of the European Economic Association, 7, 671–696.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2003) Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?, in NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc,
NBER Chapters, pp. 159–230.
Taylor, J. B. (1993) Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester Confer-
ence Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214.
Taylor, J. B. (1999) A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules, in Monetary Policy
Rules, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, pp. 319–348.
Taylor, J. B. (2009) The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of
What Went Wrong, NBERWorking Papers 14631, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Thuronyi, V. (1996) Adjusting Taxes for Inflation, in Tax Law Design and Drafting (Ed.)
V. Thuronyi, International Monetary Fund, vol. 1, chap. 13, pp. 434–476.
Vartia, L. (2008) How do Taxes Affect Investment and Productivity?: An Industry-Level
Analysis of OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers 656, OECD
Publishing.
Weber, C. E. (2000) ‘Rule-of-Thumb’ Consumption, Intertemporal Substitution, and Risk
Aversion, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 18, 497–502.
Whaples, R. (2007) Time to Eliminate the Penny from the U.S. Coinage System: New
Evidence, Eastern Economic Journal, 33, 139–146.
Woodford, M. (2001) The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy, The American Eco-
nomic Review, 91, pp. 232–237.
125
Woodford, M. (2011) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy,
Princeton University Press.
126
Appendix A
Solving the Models in Chapter 1
A.1 Solution Methods for the Two-Period Model
In this appendix, we solve the problems for each of the sectors of the two-period economic
model.
A.1.1 The Household’s Problem
Below is the Lagrangian associated with the household’s problem. The household chooses
{c1, c2, n1, n2} to maximize its intertemporal utility function, letting β > 0 represent the
intertemporal discount factor,
L(·) = ln c1−
γc1
µn1
+β
[
ln c2 −
γc2
µn2
]
+λ [(w − (1 + τ)c2 − (1 + r)(1 + τ)c1 − n2 − (r + δ)n1] ,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint.
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First-Order Conditions
The first order conditions with respect to the choice variables for the household are as follows:
∂L
∂c1
=
1
c1
− γ
µn1
− λ(1 + r)(1 + τ) = 0
∂L
∂c2
=
β
c2
− βγ
µn2
− λ(1 + τ) = 0
∂L
∂n1
=
γc1
µn21
− λ(r + δ) = 0
∂L
∂n2
=
βγc2
µn22
− λ = 0
A.2 Competitive Equilibrium in the Two-Period Model
A.2.1 Intertemporal Budget Constraints
Household We can combine equations (1.1) and (1.1) to form the household’s intertem-
poral budget constraint,
τc2 + rτc1 + n2 + (r − 1 + δ)n1 = y2 + ry1. (A.1)
Since the endowments are exogenous to the household, we can assume that the total endow-
ment is constant, or y2 + ry1 = y. As we show below, we make the same type of assumption
for government spending.
Government Combining the government’s budget constraints gives us the real intertem-
poral budget constraint
g2 + rg1 = (τ − 1)c2 + r(τ − 1)c1 + (1− ζ) [n2 + (σ + r − 1)n1] . (A.2)
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Here, as mentioned above, we can assume that the total amount of government spending is
an exogenous constant such that g2 + rg1 = g.
Equilibrium Combining equations (A.1) and (A.2) shows us that, across both periods,
the goods market clears.
c2 + rc1 + g + ζ [n
p
2 + rn
p
1] = y
Combining the individual budget constraints shows that the goods market clears within
each period as well. This model’s equilibrium, therefore, is characterized as the values of
{c1, c2, n1, n2, r, φ} which satisfy the system of six equations given by budget constraints
(A.1) and (A.2) as well as its first order conditions, where φ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the budget constraint.
A.3 Optimizing Conditions for Deterministic Model
Here we present the optimizing conditions of the agents in the deterministic model. All are
solved for using standard Bellman equation methods.
A.3.1 Patient Household
1
ct
− cχ−1t
(
1
mt
)χ
= λ2t (1 + τ)
nt = ξµ
θ−1mt
(
λ1t
λ2t − βλ2t+1 1−δπt+1
)θ
dt = (1− ξ)mt
 λ1t
λ2t − βλ2t+1
rdt
πt+1
θ
(
ct
mt
)χ
= λ1tmt
1 = β
λ2t+1
λ2t
rt
πt+1
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A.3.2 Impatient Household
1
c′t
− (c′t)χ−1
(
1
ξ
1
θ−1µn′t
)χ
= λ3t (1 + τ)
n′t =
(
c′t
ξ
1
θ−1µ
) χ
χ+1
(
1
λ3t − βλ3t+1 1−δπt+1
) 1
χ+1
1 = β
λ3t+1
λ3t
rlt
πt+1
A.3.3 Representative Bank
rlt =
rdt
1− ω
+
xd − ω
Λt+1(1− ω)
where Λt+1 ≡
βλ2t+1
λ2t
is the discount factor derived from the patient household’s Euler equation.
130
Appendix B
Solving the Model in Chapter 2
This section is devoted to solving the New Keynesian model found in section 2.2. A Bellman
method is used because is it is generally more tractable and simple than a Lagrangian
method.
B.1 The Representative Household’s Problem
Considering equations (2.15), (2.1), and (2.3) above, we can form the Bellman Equation for
the representative household.
Vh(Bt−1) = max
ct,ht,Bt
{
ηpt ln ct − (1/ψ)h
ψ
t + βEt [Vh(Bt)]
+ Λt
[
Bt−1 + (1− τt)Wtht +Dt − Bt/rt
Pt
− ct
]}
,
where Λt ≥ 0 represents the shadow price of the budget constraint. Solving this problem
for consumption, labor hours, and nominal bond holdings yields the following first order
conditions:
ηpt
ct
= Λt, (B.1)
hψ−1t = Λt(1− τt)
Wt
Pt
, (B.2)
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and
βEt [V ′h(Bt)] =
Λt
rtPt
. (B.3)
The Benveniste-Shienkman condition follows accordingly as
V ′h(Bt−1) =
Λt
Pt
. (B.4)
Combining equations (B.1)–(B.4) yields the optimizing conditions found in (2.4) and (2.5).
B.2 The Final-Good Firm’s Problem
The profits of the firm are given by
Πft = Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
= Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ηst−1
ηst di
] ηst
ηst−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di.
In this situation, the final goods-producing firm chooses the amount of each intermediate
good yt(i) for all i. Since this not a dynamic problem, first order condition is simply
Pt(i) = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ηst−1
ηst di
] 1
ηst−1
yt(i)
− 1
ηst
⇒ Pt(i) = Pty
1
ηst
t yt(i)
− 1
ηst .
Solving for yt(i) provides the demand equation for the intermediate goods by the final goods-
producing firm. Using this, the implicit price aggregator is
Ptyt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst
yt di
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⇔ Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ηstdi
] 1
1−ηst
B.3 The Intermediate-Good Firm’s Problem
After combining all of the constraints with (2.12), the Bellman equation for each firm i’s
dynamic problem is as follows:
Vf (Pt−1(i)) = max
Pt(i)
{(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−ηst ytηpt
ct
−
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst ytWtηpt
ZtPtct
− µ
2
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
ηpt + βEt [Vf (Pt(i))]
}
.
Since we combined all the constraints into the problem, there is only one first order condition
(1− ηst )
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst ytηpt
Ptct
+ ηst
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηst−1 ytWtηpt
ZtP 2t ct
−µ
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
)
ηpt
πPt−1(i)
+ βEt
[
V ′f (Pt(i))
]
= 0, (B.5)
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and one Benveniste-Shienkman condition
V ′f (Pt−1(i)) = µ
(
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
)
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)2
ηpt . (B.6)
for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Combining (B.5) and (B.6) provides the intermediate goods-producing
firms’ first order conditions.
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B.4 The Efficient Allocation
In order to solve for the output gap, consider a social planner who can overcome the frictions
in the economy caused by the nominal price rigidity. Following Ireland (2004), in each period
t, the social planner instructs nt(i) units of the representative household’s labor to produce
Qt(i) of the intermediate good, which is then combined into the final good using the same
constant returns to scale technology as above. Thus, the social planner maximizes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ηpt lnQt −
1
ψ
(∫ 1
0
nt(i)di
)ψ]
subject to the resource constraint
zt
(∫ 1
0
nt(i)
ηst−1
ηst di
) ηst
ηst−1
= Qt.
Solving this problem gives us the efficient allocation
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Solving the Model
Here I present the details of the solution process for the model, particularly those related to
the representative household, the intermediate goods firms, the set of equilibrium equations,
and the steady state equations.
C.1.1 Representative Household’s Problem
Assuming no issues with time-inconsistency, I can solve the household’s problem using the
standard Bellman method. In this case, the Bellman equation is formulated as
V(ct−1, Bt−1) = max
{
εβt
[
1
1− σc
(ct − δct−1)1−σc +
1
1− σx
[hκht (1− lt)κl ]
1−σx
]
+ βEt [V(ct, Bt)]
+
Λ1t
P ct
[
Wtlt +Dt +Bt−1 − τwt Wtlt − P ct ct − Pht hit −
Bt
rt
+ Tt
]}
where the household chooses {ct, ht, Bt}. The variable Λ1t represents the multiplier on the
budget constraint. Using the notation Vj(·) to denote the derivative of the value function
with respect to the jth term, the first order conditions of are listed below.
εβt (ct − δct−1)−σc + βEtV1(·) = Λ1t (C.1)
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εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κhxt
ht
=
P ht
P ct
Λ1t (C.2)
εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κlxt
1− lt
=
Wt
P ct
(1− τwt )Λ1t (C.3)
βEtV2(·) =
Λ1t
P ct rt
(C.4)
Additionally, the Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions are listed below
V1(·) = −δεβt (ct − δct−1)−σc (C.5)
V2(·) =
Λ1t
P ct
(C.6)
Combining equations (C.1)–(C.4) with equations (C.5)–(C.6) yields the optimality conditions
for the household.
C.1.2 Intermediate Goods-Producing Firms’ Problems
Due to the recursive nature of the intermediate goods-producing firms’ problem and consid-
ering (3.3.3) and (3.3.3) above, I can construct a simple Bellman equation for each firm j in
each sector n.
Vn
(
P nt−1(j)
)
= max
Pnt (j)
{(
P nt (j)
P nt
)1−εs,nt
Λ1ty
n
t −
(
P nt (j)
P nt
)−εs,nt WtΛ1tynt
P nt ε
p
t
−
φnp
2
(
P nt (j)
πnP nt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Λ1ty
n
t + βEt [Vn (P nt (j))]
}
(C.7)
Solving this recursive function yields one first order condition
(1− εs,nt )
(
P nt (j)
P nt
)−εs,nt Λ1tynt
P nt
+ εs,nt
(
P nt (j)
P nt
)−εs,nt −1 WtΛ1tynt
(P nt )
2εpt
−φnp
(
P nt (j)
πnP nt−1(j)
− 1
)
Λ1ty
n
t
πnP nt−1(j)
+ βEt [Vn1 (·)] = 0 (C.8)
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and one Benveniste-Scheinkman condition
Vn1 (·) = φnp
(
P nt (j)
πnP nt−1(j)
− 1
)
P nt (j)
πn
P nt−1(j)
2Λ1ty
n
t . (C.9)
Combining these two conditions yields the intermediate firms’ optimality conditions.
C.1.3 Equilibrium Equations
Below is the set of equations for the model in the symmetric equilibrium and in real terms.
xt = h
κh
t (1− lt)κl
pht =
πht
πct
pht−1
εβt (ct − δct−1)−σc − δβEt
[
εβt+1(ct+1 − δct)
−σc
]
= Λ1t
εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κhxt
ht
= pht Λ
1
t
εβt [h
κh
t (1− lt)κl ]
−σx κlxt
1− lt
= wt(1− τwt )Λ1t
βrtEt
[
Λ1t+1
Λ1tπ
c
t+1
]
= 1
yt =
(yct )
ω (yht )1−ω
ωω(1− ω)1−ω
πt = (π
c
t )
ω(πht )
1−ω
yct = ε
p
t l
c
t
yht = ε
p
t l
h
t
Λ1t y
c
t
[
(1− εs,ct ) + ε
s,c
t
wt
εpt
− φp
(
πct
πc
− 1
)
πct
πc
]
+ βφpEt
[(
πct+1
πc
− 1
)
πct+1
πc
Λ1t+1y
c
t+1
]
= 0
Λ1t y
h
t
[
(1− εs,ht ) + ε
s,h
t
wt
pht ε
p
t
− φp
(
πht
πh
− 1
)
πht
πh
]
+ βφpEt
[(
πht+1
πh
− 1
)
πht+1
πh
Λ1t+1y
h
t+1
]
= 0
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gct + p
h
t g
h
t + tt +
bt−1
πct
=
bt
rt
+ τwt wtlt.
τwt = (1− ρw)τ̄w + ρw
[
τwt−1 + γw
(
wtlt
wt−1lt−1
(πct )
1−χw − 1
)]
tt = (1− ρT )t̄+ ρT
[
tt−1 + γT
(
yt−1
yt
(πct )
χT−1 − 1
)]
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 + (1− ρr) [ρπEtπ̃t+1 + ρy(ỹt − ỹt−1)] + ηrt
lt = l
c
t + l
h
t
dct = y
c
t − wtlct −
φp
2
(
πct
πc
− 1
)2
yct
dht = y
h
t −
wt
pht
lht −
φp
2
(
πht
πh
− 1
)2
yht
yct = ct + g
c
t +
φp
2
(
πct
πc
− 1
)2
yct
yht = ht + g
h
t +
φp
2
(
πht
πh
− 1
)2
yht
εβt = (1− ρβ)εβ + ρβε
β
t−1 + η
β
t
εs,ct = (1− ρs,c)εs,c + ρs,cε
s,c
t−1 + η
s,c
t
εs,ht = (1− ρs,h)εs,h + ρs,hε
s,h
t−1 + η
s,h
t
εpt = (1− ρp)εp + ρpε
p
t−1 + η
p
t
gct = (1− ρcg)gc + ρcggct−1 + η
g,c
t
ght = (1− ρhg )gh + ρhgght−1 + η
g,h
t
C.1.4 Steady State
In this section I discuss the steady state moments of the model. Below is the list of steady
state equations.
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x = hκh(1− l)κl
(1− δβ)[(1− δ)c]−σc = Λ1
κhx
1−σx
h
= phΛ1
κlx
1−σx
1− l
= w(1− τw)Λ1
y =
(yc)ω(yh)1−ω
ωω(1− ω)1−ω
π = (πc)ω(πh)1−ω
yc = εplc
yh = εplh
w
εp
=
εs,c − 1
εs,c
w
phεp
=
εs,h − 1
εs,h
b
(
β − 1
πc
)
= g + t− τwwl
τw = τ̄w +
ρwγw
1− ρw
(
(πc)1−χ
w − 1
)
t = t̄+
ρTγT
1− ρT
(
(πc)χ
T−1 − 1
)
l = lc + lh
dc = yc − wlc
dh = yh − w
ph
lh
yc = c+ gc
yh = h+ gh
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C.2 Indexation and the Labor Wedge
Here I analyze the long run impact of indexation in the model by varying the parameters
χτ and χT . For this preliminary analysis I fix them to be equal, assuming that the quality
of indexation is equivalent on the tax and transfer sides of fiscal policy. Below are graphs
which depict consumption, health services, labor hours in both markets, and the impact on
effective tax rates, revenues, and fiscal debt levels. As can be seen, indexation seems to
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Figure C.1: Steady State Values Across Markets
have a dramatic impact in the long run. Starting with the first panel of Figure C.1, notice
that both consumption and health services increase as the tax code and transfer payments
are more perfectly indexed. The responsiveness of these variables to changes in χτ and χT
depends on the calibration of the various preference parameters. Adjusting κh = 0.50 results
in a fall in health services demanded and an increase in the consumer goods consumed.
Additionally, under this parameterization, the responsiveness of consumer goods increases
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Figure C.2: Steady State Values for the Fiscal Authority
to match that of the health services. Likewise, increasing κh has the opposite impact.
Now considering Figure C.2, notice that as the level of indexation increases, the steady
state tax rate falls, eventually settling in to the desired, target tax rate. This shows the long
run impact of bracket creep, showing that taxes will be higher in the long run if left exposed
to the influences of inflation. Looking at it from a different angle, improving the indexation
of the tax code reduces the labor wedge in the model. This is what allows higher levels of
labor and, consequently, higher level of consumption in both sectors. From a fiscal revenue
point of view, however, indexation puts downward pressure on revenue levels, resulting in
higher required long-run surpluses to balance the budget. This was the argument behind
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which included the automatic indexation policy.
Knowing the impact of bracket creep on tax revenues, the bill postponed implementing this
automatic index until 1985, hoping to reduce the impact of major tax reductions. As can be
seen in the second panel of Figure C.2, going from a non-indexed to a completely indexed
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tax code can have a massive impact on sustainable fiscal debt levels.
C.3 Impulse Responses for Model-Wide Shocks
In this section, I provide the impulse responses for shocks that impact the model as a whole.
The policy parameters in this model are set to match the estimates in Table 3.5. These are
the productivity ηpt , demand η
β
t , and monetary policy ηrt shocks.
C.3.1 Productivity Shock
As can be seen in the model, the total factor productivity εpt used by the intermediate-level
producers is identical. Thus, a shock to this impacts both sectors simultaneously. The results
are shown in Figures (C.3)–(C.5). What is interesting here is that this supply-side shock
actually manifests itself as a negative demand shock for the health services sector due to the
rise in the real price. What this means is that the inflation in the consumer goods sector
falls farther than that in the health services sector, pushing the relative price upward. Once
again I find that the interest rate is extremely persistent, yet does not react as much to the
changes in the aggregate inflation measure since inflation in the health services sector adjusts
by less. Other than those slight differences, the impact of moving from one monetary regime
to the other is minimal.
C.3.2 Demand Shock
As I showed with the productivity shock, the demand shock is an all-encompassing shock,
causing the model to react in a similar fashion regardless of the monetary regime. The
results are shown in Figures (C.6)–(C.8). With this shock, I do find more dissimilarities
between the two monetary regimes than from the productivity shock, which is expected
since consumption goods and health services are imperfect substitutes. Thus, even though
this is a standard demand shock, inflation increases only minimally before it falls, and never
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Figure C.3: Consumption-Sector Variables to
Productivity Shock
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Figure C.4: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Productivity Shock
Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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Figure C.5: Aggregate Variables to Productiv-
ity Shock
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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actually increasing in the health services sector, pushing the real price down. There are also
higher levels of fiscal debt since interest rates are higher at every point and there is more
downward pressure on labor hours in the consumption sector.
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Figure C.6: Consumption-Sector Variables to
Demand Shock
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Figure C.7: Health Services-Sector Variables
to Demand Shock
Note: The black, solid lines represent the narrow monetary policy regime, while the blue,
dashed lines represent the broad monetary policy regime. These values are calculated using
the estimated monetary policy parameters for each respective period.
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Figure C.8: Aggregate Variables to Demand
Shock
Note: With a steady state of zero, the impulse response reported for fiscal debt is in levels,
or deviations from steady state, equivalently. All other impulse responses are in percent
deviations from steady state.
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